Multilateral Diplomacy Summer School – Student Papers*

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ANNEX I:
Agenda of the Summer School on Multilateral Diplomacy

* The papers submitted were based solely on the respective students’ research, analysis and hypothesis, they do not necessarily represent the ideas or opinions of UNITAR.
The world is reaching a tipping point of growing inequalities within and amongst developing and developed nations, the looming consequences of climate change, patterns of unsustainable development and consumption, and staggering levels of poverty. These call for immediate actions, many of which can only be achieved with a multilateral system equipped to that end. A forward-looking and effective multilateralism will require governments and multilateral institutions, the UN system in particular, to engage in an open debate, drawing on the perspectives and participation of all stakeholders and partners.
Foreword

In June 2013, the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the New York Office initiated a one week intensive programme on multilateralism. This unique course aimed to extend an understanding of and an appreciation for multilateralism to university students and young professionals. This course appealed to students and young professionals who are interested in global affairs and who envisage either working for the United Nations, for another multilateral organization, for a foreign ministry, or for a non-governmental organization dealing with peace and development issues. Indeed, we were pleased that seventeen students registered and dedicated five full days in the summer in New York to learn about the UN at its Headquarters. We were very delighted to train the students on the notion of multilateralism, the conceptual origins and the various work of the UN, including: the Millennium Development Goals and the Post 2015 Sustainable Development Agenda; the role of the UN Peace-keeping Operations; and, the goals of the Department of Political Affairs. To this end, the students gained first hand insight about the UN through a medium of presentation and discourse with UN staff.

During the intensive week, the students learned that multilateralism is both critical and complicated; and that it requires inter alia cooperation to reach an agreement. At the opening of the 68th General Assembly, the President of the General Assembly, John W. Ashe, explained to heads of State and other high representatives who gathered in New York that effective multilateralism takes dogged determination and a commitment to negotiate and to work cooperatively, especially if the quest is to evolve towards a shared consensus that is both broad and lasting.” As the students learned during this course, the best results are achieved when everyone is determined to work together.

In this vain, UNITAR NYO is publishing the work of those students who submitted a paper on a theme dealing with multilateralism.* We hope you find them insightful and inspiring.

In terms of the UNITAR NYO multilateral summer course, we would like to thank the UNITAR NYO staff who supported it from conceptualization, coordination and just plain old support. To this end, I would like to especially thank Tatiana Lopez, who was involved in the initial development and Laura Marasco, who went on to coordinate the programme. Also, Leticia Sala and Macnos Mutano supported the effort. For this publication, we would like to thank Natalie Troeller and Caroline Fraser. The UNITAR NYO flourishes with great team work, and this one week intensive course for university students and young professionals exemplified the effectiveness of our team work.

Yvonne Lodico, Head of UNITAR New York Office
Access to clean water and sanitation is the key to success of the Millennium Development Goals -2015 in Africa.

by Renata B. Bolotova

Abstract
Water scarcity is a foreign opaque concept to many and a stark reality for others. It is a consequence of myriad environmental, economic, political and social forces. Unclean water and a lack of basic sanitation have exacerbated extreme poverty and diseases in the world's poorest countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of those hardest hit. (http://www.one.org/c/international/issue/954/) Millennium Development Goal 7 (MDG7) was proposed to help relieve the drastic hardships caused by water scarcity. Gaining access to clean drinking water and basic personal sanitation would dramatically increase the quality of the life of millions of African people.

Introduction
While important in its own right, MDG7 is powerful in that it provides a foundational basis for other MDG targets. Together, unclean water and poor sanitation are a leading cause of child mortality, an increased number of uneducated women, weakened maternal health, hunger and poverty throughout the African continent. It is for this reason that MDG7 should take highest priority and be ‘fast tracked’ within the UN implementation mandate.

In conclusion, this paper will suggest ways in which to prioritize and implement the MDG7 within the UN Global Partnership network in order to reach the Millennium Development Goals in Africa by 2015.

Methodology
In order to support the view of MDG7(C)’s significance on other targets I have used documents from the United Nations website and other in-house as well as independent sources. The majority of statistical information was gathered from UN regional reports in Africa from 2010-2012. These reports were based on the United Nation Statistical Division’s (UNSD) database which imports data sources from other specialized UN agencies across countries. All 8 goals and 18 targets were complemented by 48 technical indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The statistic method used in the reports relied on a novel measurement technique called “time –distance” (the time of actual implementation with the time stipulated by the schedule to the 2015 target). This measure allowed the UN to analyze their implementation progress from 2010 to 2012.
Results
Based on UN Reports, six MDGs and the most important indicators will be discussed in order to highlight both the importance of MDG7 and Africa’s failure to meet the target.

I. How MDG7(C) is related to MDG1.
Besides rapid population growth, food scarcity due to limited access to water that affects agriculture productivity is a major reason for the extreme poverty and hunger in Africa. First of all, droughts and lack of access to water make it difficult to grow crops for many African farmers. Poor agricultural productivity has raised the price of food. As highlighted in the UN 2012 African regional report, this has had a detrimental effect on the poor as a greater proportion of their money income is spent on food. Following the 2010 African regional report, the emergence of alternative users of agricultural products and the growth in growing population has resulted in additional pressure on Africa’s capacity to feed its people; resulting in many millions of Africans living on the brink of starvation. Second, old fashion and inefficient mining methods of drinking water are being replaced with more modern technologies that are unfortunately prohibitively expensive. This has led to unaffordable clean water and overpriced food especially after the global financial crisis (FAO, 2010; UN 2011). Third, after analyzing the causes of extreme poverty and hunger from UN regional reports in Africa, I came to the conclusion that water scarcity and poor agricultural techniques have also increased unemployment. In the 2012 report, the Nigeria Oyo State Government stated that water access for agriculture could generate about 20,000 jobs in Africa. Improved access to clean water can reduce poverty and hunger and increase employment and sustainable economic growth.

II. How the MDG7(C) is related to MDG2 & MDG3.
There is a strong connection between MDG7(C) and improving primary education and gender empowerment. Women are more than twice as likely as men to be responsible for water collection. First, poor access to drinking water is an essential target because time spent gathering water is largely unproductive and wasteful. For example, on average, women in the developing world walk six kilometers each day to collect water, time which could be spent in school or at work. In total, the World Health Organization estimates that 40 billion working hours are spent collecting water each year in Africa - comparable to a year’s labor for the entire workforce of France. Moreover, lack of sanitation decreases the percentage of women attending primary school leading to fewer opportunities to find a job in the future. Studies show that more than half of girls who drop out of primary school in sub-Saharan Africa do so because of a lack of separate toilets and easy access to safe water. According to UNGEI (United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative) it was identified that more than half the children out of school were girls – and despite progress in many countries, that still holds true in most regions of sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, only a few educated women are able to find a well-paid and high-skilled job. Following the UNGEI perspective, girls and boys are empowered through high-quality education to realize their full potential, leading to true equality between the sexes.
The regional report 2011 states that an education empowers women in many other ways: it enhances their participation in decision-making at home and provides access to medical services.

III. How the MDG7(C) is related to MDG4, MDG5 & MDG6
Lack of sanitation and access to water are detrimental to the economy in Africa but also result in negative knock-on effects for other MDGs. First, as many other records of MDG project pointed out, alleviating water and food scarcity would reduce poverty rates and make great progress towards decreasing U5MR (under-five mortality rate) and increase maternal health. For instance, another measure of the food deprivation is the prevalence of underweight children under five years of age and heightened child mortality rates. The 2012 African regional report maintains that malnutrition of children is the underlying cause of more than a third of under-five year old deaths and more than 20 per cent of maternal deaths (UNICEF, 2011b; p 46).
What’s more, poverty also decreases access to, and utilization of, healthcare services. This results in a high proportion of malaria-related deaths among children under five years of age and women. For instance, the UN regional report 2010 in Africa estimates that from 91 percent deaths in Africa about 85 percent were of children under-five years of age and pregnant women who are also vulnerable to a malaria epidemic. This is largely attributed to expensive medical treatment (GAVI, 2009). Lack of sanitation and clean water also poses a threat to children’s lives.

According to the UN survey, around 2,000 children die daily from diarrhea, which is spread as a result of poor sanitation and hygiene. As with many challenges in development, children and their mothers are disproportionately impacted by scarcities of clean water and adequate sanitation.
In light of these findings, the UN and private organizations should turn their attention to MDG7(C) in order to reach the MDG targets by 2015. Access to water and basic sanitation can improve millions of lives in Africa. It could reduce starvation amongst women and children, and lessen the spread of diseases caused resulting from poor hygiene and access to medical care.

IV. The mission MDG7(C) is an opportunity for UN to create a sustainable Global Partnership – MDG8.
The United Nations along with the initiative of Security General Kofi Annan has created a special network that provides a bridge between the UN with private and public organizations in a Global Partnership. "The UN Global Compact was officially launched in New York on July, 2000 and it became a leadership platform for the development, implementation and disclosure of responsible and sustainable corporate policies and practices" (http://unglobalcompact.org/Issues/Business_Partnerships/index.htm). Such a network provides the opportunity to create a strong and inclusive global economy. The Organization has two main objectives: make ten principles part of business strategy and operation in all countries (the principles are available in the UN Global Compact website http://unglobalcompact.org) and take actions in UN goals and issue. And one of their main concentrations supports the Millennium Development Goals.
Such a network facilitates and encourages dialogue (policy dialogues, learning, local networks and projects) and maintains plans for actions towards MDG project on Global level. Unlike other networks or organizations, the Global Compact involves civil society and labor organizations to participate and contribute towards Millennium Development Goals.

As it has been pointed out in the Global Compact Conference, businesses play a huge role in achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as they act as a financial tool for development and the implementation progress. The Global Compact provides a bridge between units of the UN and businesses within the private sector. Practical and efficient implementation of the network towards MDG7(C) can create a new Global Partnership.

Solutions:
Universal access to improved sanitation alone could reduce diarrhea-related morbidity by more than one third. If the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets on water and sanitation are met, “there will be 203,000 fewer child deaths in 2015 and 272 million school days would be gained with the subsequent reduction in diarrhea and related issues”. The benefits of improving access to water and sanitation go beyond any one sector. Meeting the water and sanitation MDG would have “a total annual economic benefit of $22 billion for the continent. It is estimated that every $1 spent on water and sanitation generates returns of $4 in increased economic opportunity. If the MDG targets on water and sanitation are met by 2015, national governments in sub-Saharan Africa could save about 12% of annual public health expenditures”.

Even though the issue of water sources has been discussed at the Global Compact’s Private Sector Forum, my research supports the view that Water Management should concentrate not only on improving agricultural benefits but also prioritizing the households’ access to clean water. A major focus should be on generating wider access to water and spring protection. Emphasis should be placed on wasting less water on Agricultural Infrastructure as a fast way to achieve MDG7(C) and other targets.

Why is protecting spring water important? First, spring protection dramatically improves source water quality. It’s been shown to eliminate fecal matter contamination by two-third at the water source and by nearly one-quarter in users’ home water supply. Second, spring protection is a cost effective option to reduce diarrhea and other decease in young children and pregnant women (MDG2 & MDG3).

Other efforts yield similarly positive results and should be pursued conscientiously. Water purifying technologies, such as chlorine dispensers, provide long term and extremely cost effective solutions. Rudimentary pipes and pumps could transport drinking water much closer to rural living areas greatly enhancing quality of life for women and children.

Dr. Atul Gawande of Harvard Medical School noted in his recent New York Times article titled ‘Slow Ideas’ that basic health and sanitation education in developing countries is often much more productive than costly technological solutions. With these findings in mind I suggest the implementation of lectures and seminars targeting the young generation and households stressing proper drinking water and waste management.
Conclusion:
The Millennium Development Goals were created as a means to improve the lives of millions of poor people all over the World. However, the time-pressing nature of the goals and poor living conditions pose a challenge for many developing countries. It has been concluded that Africa will fail to meet most targets.

There is a strong correlation between access to sanitation and safe drinking water and successful development and achieving other Millennium Goals. Improved sanitation and clean water source could make a huge impact not only on Africa but also around the World. Even though all identified targets seem to be achievable and progress has been made in many countries, it remains a slow process in Sub-Saharan Africa and there is only a small chance of meeting the targets by 2015. Nevertheless, the MDG project could be a success in Africa if the UN uses the Global Compact as a tool to achieve MDG7(C) through creating a new Global Partnership.

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The Cluster System and Multilateralism

Kyla Korvne

Abstract
The United Nations has recently attempted to re-examine multilateralism in the contexts of human security, peacekeeping, and humanitarianism. Using the cluster approach to humanitarian crisis response as a framework, this paper looks at the main obstacles for global multilateralism in humanitarianism. Leadership, information management and communications, accountability, and legitimacy all pose problems for the effective implementation of the cluster approach and multilateralism. The cluster approach attempts to group actors with similar goals and expertise during humanitarian crises in order to coordinate operations and improve missions. Designating leaders in a multilateral context creates tension and can be detrimental if insufficient. Information management has been handled relatively well within the cluster system, but can damage accountability and legitimacy if not made available to affected people in a crisis. This paper analyzes the crucial issues facing multilateralism in the context of the much criticized cluster system.

Introduction
The effects of globalization, exacerbated in 2008 by the global financial crisis, have forced the world to dust off and re-examine multilateralism as an effective way to collaborate with each other on issues such as global economics and human security (Martin, 2009, p.3). After the 2008 United States elections, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed his hope that a “new multilateralism” would profess itself in diplomacy, development, and peace keeping both within the UN system and worldwide. This ‘new multilateralism’ “focuses on stimulating a greater sense of shared responsibility and willingness to cooperate among nation states, as well as reform of the institutions designed to manage that co-operation” (Martin, 2009, p.3). Although multilateralism is not a new word in the UN vernacular, a multilateral approach to human security and humanitarianism has been slow in getting on its feet. Ironically, “the most common usage and context for... multilateralism is the co-ordination and co-operation of multiple actors to deliver peace and security” (Martin, 2009, p.5). In December of 1991, General Assembly resolution 46/182 set the foundations for the cluster approach to humanitarian coordination, which developed in 2005 following the response to the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the Darfur crisis (Heath, 2012, p.5). The resolution states that it was drafted while “Mindful of the need to strengthen further and make more effective the collective efforts of the international community, in particular the United Nations system, in providing humanitarian assistance”
Unfortunately, most evaluations agree that the need expressed in resolution 46/182 has not been met by the cluster approach. This paper will begin to describe how the cluster approach acts as an excellent microcosm for multilateralism on a larger scale and within the UN system. The approach faces a range of complex problems and obstacles that also overwhelm multilateralism itself, including leadership, accountability, information management and communication, and legitimacy.

An overview of the cluster approach

The cluster approach is set up to work on both a global and country level. According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), on a global level the cluster approach is intended to “strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring that there is predictable leadership and accountability in the main sectors or areas of humanitarian response (Steets et al, 2010, p.24). On a country level, the approach divides the responsive actors in a humanitarian crisis into clusters based on the actor’s area of expertise (Humanitarian Response, 2013). Figure 1 shows the categories set by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) along with the lead agency of the cluster.

Figure 1

The official clusters include health (lead agency: WHO), logistics (WFP), nutrition (UNICEF), protection (UNHCR), shelter (IFRC/UNHCR), water, sanitation and hygiene (UNICEF), camp construction and camp management (IOM/UNHCR), early recovery (UNDP), education (UNICEF/Save the Children), emergency telecommunications (WFP), and food security (WPF/FAO). http://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach
Heath (2012) aptly summarizes the popular critique of the approach: “A coordination mechanism such as the Cluster Approach may exercise substantial power without actually accomplishing its stated mission or orderly disaster relief” (p.1). As is true with multilateralism, the cluster approach acts as a “framework for the exercise of power” (Heath, 2012, p.1). Multilateral systems such as the cluster approach attempt to control and shape this framework.

Within the cluster approach, the lead agencies and humanitarian coordinator control much of the power. Lead agencies are responsible for most planning and monitoring of coordination and information, facilitating meetings, and mapping out the needs present in the given situation (Heath, 2012, pgs.5-8). Cluster meetings are supposed to include all cluster participants and act as a platform for information sharing, strategy planning, coordination of activities, the creation of joint funding appeals, and feedback (Heath, 2012, p.8). Humanitarian coordinators are supervised by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and oversee the lead organizations and operations as a whole. (Heath, 2012, p.20).

**Challenges of multilateralism and the cluster approach Leadership.**

There are several problems that arise under the umbrella of leadership within the cluster approach. In any multilateral system, the question of leadership causes tensions. Can multilateralism function without a leader? If not, how is the leader chosen? What legitimates their leadership? What forces or motivates the other parties to accept their leadership? Martin (2009) argues that effective multilateralism requires strong leadership with clear strategic direction, both on the ground and on the global stage (p.7).

In the case of the country level cluster approach, the lead agencies are designated by the humanitarian coordinator who is appointed by OCHA (Humanitarian Response, 2013). At the global level they are selected by IASC and it is generally preferred that they be the same at the local level as well (Heath, 2012, p.6). The simple act of designating leaders in a humanitarian crisis has heavy consequences for policy. It would be relatively easy for the lead agency of a cluster to impose their principles and policy onto the entire cluster. Cluster meetings could be dominated by the lead agency, since they facilitate them. Think of the Security Council; the five permanent members with veto power hold much more sway in meetings and policy decisions than anyone else present—their principles shape policy.

There is no legal relationship between lead agencies and others, so any motivation to accept their leadership comes mainly from the desire to receive funding (Heath, 2012, p.8). This lowers the legitimacy of the lead agencies, as does the fact that facilitators are often junior and/or untrained and do not spend enough time on coordination in meetings.
Information and reporting is also largely in the hands of the cluster leads and coordinators, which seriously shifts the power dynamics of the cluster (Steets et al., 2010, p.28). Information management is key to effective multilateralism, especially in a humanitarian crisis where many actors are working towards similar goals.

**Information management and communication**

In his assessment of global governance and the cluster approach in Haiti, Bolton (2011) observes “these clusters, at best, seem capable of only passing basic information and delivering few concrete results during a fast-moving emergency” (p.12). Information management and communications are both strong points and shortcomings in the cluster system. Insufficiently facilitated meetings are detrimental to information sharing and the general lack of “institutional memory” is also a problem; every time cluster leadership changes, which can be quite often, valuable information is lost.

The current “digital epicenter” of the aid world and official cluster website is OneResponse (a title which is controversial itself). OneResponse is home to meeting minutes, contact lists, documents, and general information regarding all of the clusters and their operations (Bolton, 2011, p.24).

The cluster approach evaluation commissioned by the IASC and the Global Public Policy Institute found that many of the humanitarian actors in their study had positive things to say about the information sharing opportunities that the clusters provided. This was generally on the local level, the large online communication frameworks set up by OCHA were found to be high-maintenance and inaccessible for lower-level actors (such as locals affected by or involved in the crisis or emergency)(Steets et al., 2010, p.47). This brings up questions of accountability and legitimacy.

Accessing OneResponse and the cluster listservs requires not only a computer but also Internet connection and some technological literacy, which makes participating in communication between and within clusters extremely difficult and expensive, if not impossible, for locals and smaller organizations. It is hard to consider a humanitarian operation where human security is at stake, when the very people who are receiving aid cannot even access the information they would need to hold their ‘rescuers’ accountable. As Martin (2009) points out, “Locals have to be seen as multilateral partners too” (p.8).

**Accountability and legitimacy.**

“Who watches the watchers?” Heath (2012) poses an interesting question; which is complicated by the fact that the watchers are not actually individuals or even a “well-defined organization” (p.17). How do you hold a multilateral system accountable? By treating it like an individual, or by holding each part of the network separately accountable? Is it still multilateral if that path is chosen? Is a horizontal system of accountability possible in an inter-
national multilateral context? Peer review has started to emerge in the clusters as an answer to this question (Heath, 2012, p.4). To a degree, OCHA acts as a watcher of the watchers. They cannot directly supervise the humanitarian coordinator or the clusters, so they aren't very effective as a watcher in this scenario (Heath, 2012, p.22). The cluster approach in general has largely failed to create a context-sensitive and receptive system of accountability and a performance measurement. Guiding principle four in the annex of resolution 46/182 states, “each state has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of its victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory” (U.N. General Assembly, 1991, p.2). This immediately complicates and delegitimizes any actions of non-state actors. The cluster network is also not approachable for the local population, which creates both accountability and legitimacy issues. When multilateralism is applied to a humanitarian context, the affected population must be included in the multilateral network, or it will be ineffective and lack legitimacy. Unfortunately, cluster procedure often makes this participation impossible. Clusters are designed to increase predictability, which means that there is less room for local adaptation (Steets et al, 2010, p.38). The location and language of cluster meetings is also important, as it dictates who is able to attend and understand. When the operation is not legitimate in the eyes of the organizations that are participating or the local population, no amount of coordination will get anyone anywhere.

**Conclusions**

Multilateralism is the norm in humanitarian crisis management. However, because of problems with leadership systems, information management and communication, accountability, and legitimacy, many missions are unsuccessful or ineffective (Martin, 2009, p.1). The cluster approach as an example of the struggles of multilateralism illustrates all of these issues. Different actors use different resources and implementation methods in different ways. Coordinating them does not come without challenges. In any multilateral context, it is “difficult to produce sustained, strategic and steady political action. Because networks don’t have a centralized leadership structure...they have real difficulty reaching consensus and setting goals” (Bolton, 2011, p.19). In order for the cluster approach, and multilateralism as a whole, to be effective, it must act as an “enabler” for collective action and decision-making (Martin, 2009, p.4).

The question is: is multilateralism worth it? Can multiple international actors act cohesively in a humanitarian or peace building setting without merely adding to the confusion and complexities?
References


ADÉRITO R. VICENTE

Introduction

Established in 1946, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the main organs of the United Nations. According to article 24, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter, the Member States have conferred "on theSecurity Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", and have agreed that this body, in order to carry on this duty, "acts on their behalf". Moreover, the UN Member States have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" in accordance with article 25 of the Charter. While other organs of the United Nations can only make recommendations to governments, the UNSC is the only organ capable of issuing resolutions that are legally binding on all Member States. Thus, the UNSC is undoubtedly the most powerful organ of the United Nations.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Security Council has been central in the conduct of global political relations. While the international community has undergone massive change during that period, principally through decolonization and then the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the UNSC has remained virtually unaltered – with the exception of the 1965 amendment, which concerns the increase of the number of elected members of the Council from six to ten. At present, the UNSC has fifteen members: five permanent members and ten non-permanent members. On the one hand, the current Permanent Five (P5) of this body and the holders of veto power are: the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. On the other hand, the other ten non-permanent members of the UNSC are elected by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) through majority vote to take on a two-year term. To ensure better regional representation, non-permanent members are elected from different regional groups.

Since its birth, however, the UNSC has been faced with considerable criticism and ever since there have been many calls for reform. A large part of the criticism is due to the structure of the Council and its 'power of veto', which many believe is undemocratic especially because it gives extensive power and exclusive privileges to the P5.

As a result, many academics and politicians alike have criticized the UNSC for its small size and exclusive nature, its relations with the UNGA, its working methods, and its 'undemocratic' structure (Okhovat, 2011). For that reason, any Member State may be elected to serve a temporary term in
the UNSC, but critics have suggested that this is inadequate. Rather, they argue, the number of permanent members should be expanded to include non-nuclear powers, which would democratize the organization. For instance, its limited geographical balance combined with P5 seats that have veto powers, however, makes the Security Council less representative than desired by many Member States – especially rising powers – which are increasingly calling for a reform of the UNSC (von Freiesleben, 2005). Still other nations have advocated abolishing the concept of permanency altogether.

While there is general agreement that the UNSC needs to be reformed, there is extensive disagreement on the method making the subject both extremely divisive and litigious. For many, the reform of the Security Council is a question of its continuing legitimacy. An expansion of the membership could help enhance its authority. A review of the working methods could make it more transparent whereas agreeing to limit the use of the veto power in cases of jus cogens crimes – or at least explaining a cast veto – could broaden its appeal. To others, reforming the UNSC is mainly about increasing its own power; a seat at the table could potentially translate into greatly increased influence over much of the UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions and/or the International Court of Justice (Ibid).

Ultimately, an effective United Nations system depends on a UNSC that reflects the world as it is – and whose members are willing and capable to meet their important tasks. However, the UNSC is unlikely to be altered any time soon. Any resolution to expand the UNSC would need to garner the support of two-thirds of the 193 members of the UNGA, or 129 votes, as well as endorsement by the P5 to succeed. Therefore, the membership remains deadlocked, with three blocs each competing for its preferred proposal. The first is the so-called 'G4 coalition' of aspirants to permanent (or long-term) membership – Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan, plus their allies. The second is the so-called 'Uniting for Consensus' coalition, led by the G4’s regional rivals (including Mexico, Pakistan, Italy and South Korea), which advocate for an increased number of rotating elected seats. And the third is the Africa bloc, committed to a formula – the Ezulwini Consensus – that claims on at least two new permanent seats for Africa.

Hence, this policy paper explores both the concept and the reform of the veto power, as well as the attempts that have been made to allow more countries the power to veto, along with a conceptual analysis of the arguments for and against extending this power to other UN members. This paper proceeds through three main sections. The first section analyses the concept of the veto power, and demonstrates how the use of veto is now distinct from that initial reason and how this power has turned into a device for protecting national interests of P5 or their strategic allies. The second section looks through the history of the efforts to reform the undemocratic structure of the UNSC and examines the main impediments towards the reform of the Security Council. The third section indicates a detailed recommendation for specific steps on how to implement the recommended policy option (and criteria).
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the current structure and performance of the Council mainly through analyzing the use of veto power. It also intends to investigate current proposals and efforts towards the reform of this body. A recommendation will be provided in the conclusion.

1. The concept of Veto power

A crucial aspect of the privileged and responsible position assigned to the P5, by the Charter, is the veto power. Each of the P5 has the power to block any substantive decision of the Security Council. As mentioned earlier, Article 27 of the UN Charter allows permanent members of the Security Council to repeal any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes, regardless of its level of international support and popularity. This power is referred to as the veto power of the P5. Nonetheless, the word “veto” is never mentioned in the UN Charter (Okhovat, 2011).

When the UNSC was established in San Francisco, it consisted of eleven members – five permanent and six elected. The initial motive for the inclusion of the veto power in the Charter was to prevent the UN to take direct actions against any of its principal founding members (Ibid). The P5 were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Republic of China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – the so called victors of the Second World War. The elected members would serve on the UNSC for a term of two years. The P5 were given their permanency, and the extraordinary power of the veto, because they were able to argue fruitfully against onerous opposition, that unless these powers were given to them, there would be no United Nations. In fact, to confirm that rationale, the U.S. representative, at San Francisco, defended that killing the veto would kill the Charter (UN Information Organizations, 1945).

The representatives of Soviet Union, France and China adopted similar positions, but the position of the representative of the UK (UN Information Organizations, 1945, p. 4434) deserves reflection, he explained that:

The present voting provisions were in the interest of all states and not merely of the permanent members of the Security Council... [Therefore,] the veto power was a means of preserving that unanimity and far from being a menace to the small powers, it was their essential safeguard. Without that unanimity all countries, large and small, would fall victims to the establishment of gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some future Armageddon. Cooperation among the great powers was the only escape from this peril; nothing was of comparable importance.

The British diplomat, of course, has a way with words, but as this posturing showed, also a remarkable capacity for self-serving rhetoric. What was the Cold War? If not a “gigantic rivalry of blocs” with its associated capacity for Armageddon – the nuclear arms race – which endured for almost 50 years. Nevertheless, the P5 arguments prevailed – under the Yalta voting formula – and the UN was born in the curious form, described by Ambassador Richard Butler (2012, p. 29), as "a community
of equals, but within which, without doing too much violence to George Orwell, there clearly were five who were vastly more equal than their equals."

Another important seminal argument made by the P5 was the need to avoid conditions that led to the downfall of the League of Nations, the P5 insisted on having individual vetoes over UN Charter amendments. Article 108 effectively provides each permanent member with a trump card that can overrule any efforts to weaken its formal power, although virtually all of the other UN Member States criticize the veto as inequitable (Russet, 1997; Hoopes & Brinkley, 1997). The veto has been and remains an obstacle to reform both because of the P5’s traditional interests in preserving power and because no provision in the UN Charter requires them to resign this right. In their pursuit of raisons d’état, States use whatever institutions are available to serve their interests (Weiss, 2001).

Before turning to the questions of UNSC reform about the arguments for and against the veto power extension to other UN Member States, a few remarks need to be made on what has proven to be the reality of this heavily one-sided decision making system.

In the first instance, the P5 have at their disposal, imbedded in the Charter, four vetoes, not one. The veto that has been generally addressed, so far, is that of the adoption by the UNSC of any substantive and binding decisions pursuant to Article 25. This is the first of the UNSC’s vetoes. The others include a veto over the recommendation to the General Assembly of a person to be appointed UN Secretary-General (Article 97); a veto over applications for membership of the United Nations (Art. 4); and perhaps crucially, a veto over any amendment to the Charter (Art. 198). As a result, any attempt to change their positions and powers must, itself, be agreed to by all of P5.

Secondly, it is worth mentioning to what has been known as the “double veto.” In addition to the open or clearly visible veto, that is the rejection of a substantive proposal in the UNSC, there has been the so-called “double veto”. This procedure arises in the context of a possible difference of opinion within the Council on whether or not a proposed decision is of a procedural or substantive character. The procedural decision, at least in theory and according to the Charter, requires a simple majority. If the President of the Security Council makes a ruling on such a matter, to which there is then a challenge, he is obliged to put this immediately to a decision by a vote of the UNSC. In this context, it has become accepted that P5 can exercise a veto, i.e. if any one of them disagrees with the vote then taken in the UNSC on whether or not a matter is procedural or substantive, the P5 can veto that outcome.

There is also the threatened veto. It would simply be impossible to calculate how many times the decision making process of the UNSC, in an informal, private session, has been shaped by the threat of a veto to be cast in a formal session by one of the P5. According to Ambassador Richard Butler (2012, p. 30), Penn State’s University Distinguished Scholar of International Peace and Security, this distinction between private and public sessions is an important one, defended that:
Having taken part in meetings of the Security Council for almost three years, I can affirm that the great proportion of what takes place in the Council is not seen publicly. If I were to put a percentage on the amount of time I spent in the Security Council private meeting room, as against in the public chamber, I suspect it would come out in the order of ninety-eight percent to two percent, respectively.

Furthermore, there is also the veto delivered on behalf of a non-permanent member. This veto became a dominant feature of the first fifty years of the Security Council's life.

As a result, since the beginning of its work, there have been 229 vetoes cast in the UNSC. The U.S.S.R./Russia has cast 99, the United States 78, the United Kingdom 29, France 16, and China 7 (See Appendix B). The vetoes by Russia and the United States were cast largely in the period of the Cold War, and by each of them in defense of their "friendly" States. For example, Russia would veto on behalf of Eastern European allies and the United States would often veto for Israel.

Nowadays, one can argue that after the end of the Cold War and because of the elimination of ideological divisions among the superpowers, the veto has been cast more sparingly. However, a look at the use of veto in the last two decades reveals that although being cast less often, the veto is still exercised for self-interest or the interests of the Second World War allies. Thus, over the last 22 years out of a total of 30 vetoes, 13 have been used by Washington to protect Israel (UN Research Guides & Resources, 2013).

Furthermore, it should not be neglected the influence of the so called "pocket veto", as on many occasions permanent members managed to keep an issue off the UNSC agenda or lessen the language of a resolution without actually casting a veto by mere threats of using that power (Okhovat, 2011).

The existence of permanent membership on the UNSC and the associated veto power has had what has come to be known as the "cascade effect." This ludicrous term seeks to describe the very existent 'prodigy' of the extension of effective permanent membership rights to the P5 in virtually all other UN agencies, Commissions, and Committees. At most UN elections it is purely considered incontestable that those P5 will automatically be on the Committee, on the Board of Governors, or on whatever instrumentality is involved. By extension, even though there is no formal veto anywhere other than the UNSC, the language of veto is freely spoken and threatened and very often shapes outcomes in such bodies (Butler, 2012).

Moreover, vetoing a UN action against a State that is clearly in violation of international law and practice because that State is an ally should not be acceptable. This practice was never intended in San Francisco and it should not be acceptable in practical, political reality. Yet, this position has been repeatedly accepted. Using votes as a favors is possibly the most significant instance of abuse of permanent privilege (Butler, 2012). For instance, that is why most of the UN peacekeeping mis-
sions undertaken by a UNSC Resolution were and are in the African Continent, and not in other regions that are closed to P5 interests or allies.

Some might say that the veto privilege of the P5 remains the chief cause for the undermined credibility of the United Nations and its inability to function as a democratic body. Although the moral and pragmatic consequences of such a regulation are obvious, above all, one must recognize its legal implications (Köchler, 1991; Okhovat, 2011). The extent to which this misinterpretation of their power – some indeed have called it abuse of their power – has been applied, has varied (Butler, 2012). However, others might suggest that the legitimacy of the UNSC as currently constituted is clear and emanates from the UN Charter. As long as the Charter remains in force and unamended, the existing UNSC structure is legitimate (McDonald & Patrick, 2010).

It is now beyond any doubt that the great privilege – veto power – given to the P5 has come to be appropriated by them as a right by the UN Charter. The P5 have behaved and continue to act in ways that put forward the power that they hold as rightful and free, to be used by the 'main victors' of the Second World War in whatever manner they choose. The concept that this power was given to them, over arduous objections, but for the reason of the good that it might do in preserving the peace, has been substantially replaced by the notion that P5 have a power that they can use to protect and extend their own individual national interests. This selfish outlook is often not consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter (Butler, 2012).

At the end of the day, any serious, substantive review of the decision-making methodology to be employed in a reformed UNSC, with a modern constituency, would need to address the question of whether or not there should be vetoes. If there are vetoes, then there needs to be a new and different understanding of the circumstances under which the veto can be legitimately used (Ibid; Köchler, 1991).

2. Arguments For and Against Veto extension

The previous section visibly shows the undemocratic nature of the veto power. It illustrates the substantial power that it gives to a few countries to protect their interests. This power has been one of the main impediments against the UNSC reform. There are few UN Member States who support the veto power. Obviously the permanent members are supportive of such a power for self-serving reasons. Back in the 1990s, 185 Member States criticized the veto as inequitable (Weiss, 2005). For instance, Ahmad Kamal (2013), former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, defended that “in a democracy no one can be more equal than the others” and labeled the veto anachronistic and undemocratic. Many African countries shared that sentiment as well (Lund, 2010).

Moreover, if the veto was undemocratic for the Security Council’s work, should this privilege be given to new permanent members? Would that not make the lowermost common denominator?
As Jakob Silas Lund (2010) explains in his piece, those who oppose the abolition of veto refer to the fall of the League of Nations because major powers like the United States refused to join. The ‘veto abolitionists’ argue that if the veto is eliminated the UN can follow the same fate with major powers leaving this body or refusing to pay for those actions they oppose. Once more, the possibility of such outcome is questionable particularly considering the current status of the UN and the level of support for it. It is unlikely that any member would risk leaving the UN as it will be a serious blow to its legitimacy but one cannot totally rule out this possibility, especially considering that United Nations has the capacity to do such an action (Okhovat, 2011). However, some American critics like David Holcberg (2001), researcher at the Ayn Rand Institute, California, defended that the United States should withdraw from the UN. Holcberg's main argument which relies on the constraints that the UN imposes on the U.S. foreign policies, as well as the claim that most of the UN Member States do not support human rights and for that reason the United States should act unilaterally in order to be able to pursue the policies that support human rights.

Additionally, there are also some apocalyptic arguments about the importance of veto which do not necessarily carry much persuasive weight. Some political analysts support the idea that the P5 are all nuclear countries, and therefore, those who can impose their decisions by deterrence (Okhovat, 2011). Others added that the P-5 have large nuclear arsenals and the consequent ability to initiate a full-scale nuclear war. As a result, the veto power has to stay in order to enable them to end measures that are threatening to them diplomatically. In this manner, the international community could avoid the dissatisfaction of these nuclear powers which has the potential to result in international tension and the possible waging of a nuclear war (Beck, 2004).

Notwithstanding, the reform debate has also led to other proposals that stop short of charter amendments and provide alternative formulas to finesse the issue of the veto. The P-5 could voluntarily exercise greater restraint, for example, by restricting the exercise of the veto only to matters that fall under the obligatory provisions of enforcement decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter (Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin, 1996). For cases of humanitarian intervention, the P-5 could abstain where vital interests are not involved (ICISS, 2001). Such restraint would offer no guarantees, of course, and would also set an unusual precedent of calling on selected states to give up rights acquired by treaties. Alternatively, coalitions of states might seek institutional moral stamps of approval outside the UNSC (Weiss, 2001). Therefore, there are those who believe that the veto should be extended to other countries for questions of new distribution of power and geographical entitlement – shared leadership with rising powers vision. But, there are others that still believe that P5 veto represents the spirit of UN Charter and modifying it would create issues of credibility – maintaining the status-quo view.

On the one hand, the maintaining the status-quo view acknowledges that the UNSC’s relevance is not declining; since it remains the premier multilateral institution for matters of international security. UN member states exploit a range of frameworks, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible; the Council authorizes regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and
interest-based partnerships to advance their national and collective security. Examples range from NATO to the Six Party Talks on North Korea. Every October, the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. Even countries that make a profession of attacking the UNSC’s credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat – suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige (McDonald & Patrick, 2010). Furthermore, opponents of the veto extension dispute that the UNSC is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, arguing that it remains the most effective of all UN organs and that the UNSC’s permanent structure still reflects the leading political and military powers. Therefore, UNSC enlargement would dilute P5 power, increase gridlock, encourage lowest-common-denominator actions, and empower antagonistic leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Another argument that is used by the critics of extending veto to other UN Member States is the UN Charter itself. Amending the Charter is an onerous process, facing numerous obstacles: requiring not only approval of two-thirds of the UNGA, but also ratification of the relevant domestic legislation by two-thirds of UN member states, including all of the P5 (Chapter XVIII, Articles 108–109). The charter has been revised only three times in sixty-five years, including in 1965, when the UNSC expanded from eleven to fifteen by adding four elected members, as we have seen in previous sections. Nevertheless, recent polls suggest public support for a modest expansion of the UNSC’s permanent membership, including seats for Germany, Japan, Brazil, India and South Africa (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).

On the other hand, proponents of veto extension observe that the distribution of global power has changed dramatically since 1945, and that the number of UN member states has surged from 51 to 193 without a parallel expansion of the UNSC. The veto power, for example, excludes major UN funders like Japan and Germany, rising powers like India and Brazil, and all of Africa and Latin America. Enlargement proponents warn that the UNSC’s global authority will erode if it fails to expand membership from underrepresented regions. Furthermore, skillfully accomplished enlargement could provide a near-term opportunity to manage power transitions, “socializing” today’s regional leaders into “responsible” global actors that shoulder a greater share of international security. If expansion is inevitable, proponents believe, the United States should lead it now – when it retains unparalleled ability to shape the terms of the debate – rather than get dragged along by others later. However, the expectation that permanent UNSC membership will tame obstreperous state behavior at the UN is naive, and championing, reform prior to confidence-building among – and demonstrated responsible behavior by – regional leaders could be disastrous (McDonald & Patrick, 2010).

While many arguments often offered in support of veto enlargement are flawed, the case for expanding the UNSC is a compelling one. After almost 70 years, some might say that the UNSC suffers from deficit of representativeness. Whereas the original ratio was one permanent member for 10 countries, today it is one permanent member for nearly 40 countries. Whole regions of the world
are locked out of the decision-making. About 85% of the items on the UNSC agenda deal with Africa, and yet the continent has no voice equivalent to a P5.

Therefore, a common claim, particularly in the developing world, is that the UNSC is increasingly illegitimate and ineffective – given the lack of geographic balance in the UNSC’s permanent membership and its failure to include regional leaders –, declining relevance to today’s security threats, inability to ensure compliance with its ostensibly binding resolutions, and exclusion of countries that could contribute to international security. According to this analysis, the actual behavior of UN Member States, as opposed to their rhetoric, suggests the UNSC’s legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness are more robust than critics claim. Nevertheless, failure to enlarge the UNSC is problematic, for it excludes permanent membership powerful countries that could contribute to international security and offer long-term political support for the United Nations (Ibid). In this new environment, the relevant question is: What composition does the UNSC need to fulfill its mandate to maintain international peace and security?

Among the P5 members, France is most enthusiastic about enlargement; followed by the United Kingdom. This public stance may be motivated by the growing vulnerability of their own permanent seats, given perceptions that Europe is overrepresented among the P-5. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty increases pressure to consolidate the two nations’ membership into a single seat for the European Union, something neither seems prepared to contemplate. For the United States and Obama administration, the UNSC enlargement narrative should be set from entitlement to responsibility, spur better multilateral cooperation in the near term, and lead the negotiation toward a modest expansion that advances the United States’ interests in the long run. Russia, sensitive to any decline in relative power, opposes additional permanent members and efforts to qualify the P5 veto. China says it is open to UNSC expansion, including additional elected members from Africa, but will likely resist any new permanent members (with particular animus to adding Japan and, increasingly, regional rival India). Chinese officials argue that adding permanent members would only exacerbate representation issues and antagonize the next row of countries. China has signaled openness to the ‘halfway’ approach, but may consider it a step to defer G4 ambitions (McDonald & Patrick, 2010). Ultimately, the P5 countries, including the United States, are, in essence, guarding themselves; they will not give up their vetoes easily.

3. Recommended Policy:
Reach (P-5) Consensus for Limited UNSC (Veto power) Enlargement based on Criteria rather than Entitlement

To conclude this paper with what some would consider a naïve, untamed, or even a "modest" proposal, but I think in the spirit of inquiry and creative thinking, it is worth mentioning. In a world beginning to move with determination toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, an ambitious U.S. foreign policy, would adopt a stance reflecting contemporary realities instead of clinging to the past. Since the United States is considered the permanent member with the capability to lead the
UNSC reform, it would be wise for Washington to concede that the UNSC has played an important role, but, in its present form, has passed its use-by date (Butler, 2012).

The first step should involve a high-profile public speech made by President Obama – such as the UNGA opening session in September 2011, or the 2009 Prague Speech, or even the 2013 inauguration speech – at an early date and after interagency deliberations, to declare U.S. openness to a modest expansion of the UNSC contingent on demonstrated evidence of aspirants' capacity and willingness to contribute to international peace and security (McDonald & Patrick, 2010).

The second step would be after initial consultations and agreement with P5 partners by the United States, President Obama's speech should outline the roadmap and criteria for this UNSC enlargement – these features must be agreed and co-authored by at least one of the Eastern Powers (China or Russia) –, and serve as a launching pad for U.S. consultations with aspirant countries on initiatives that will help them demonstrate the qualifications for permanent membership/veto power. The hurdle to UNSC permanent membership must remain high and aspirant Member States should demonstrate an ability to broker and deliver global solutions to transnational threats; such initiatives might include demonstrating leadership in non-proliferation talks, climate change negotiations, or the advancement of human rights (Ibid).

The third step aims to shape the outline of an international agreement that takes a criterion – based on an evolutionary approach, the P5 should initiate and chair an interagency review led by the United States, and, preferably co-led by China or Russia. In addition, the P5 should also instruct their intelligence agencies to plan potential negotiation scenarios, UNSC compositions (including temporary options), likely behavior of aspirant Member States, and their effects on P5 interests. Meanwhile, the interagency committee should identify a draft list of qualifications for evaluating new permanent candidates (see Appendix C) and a diplomatic strategy to achieve P5 consensus on the criteria.

In my opinion, the criteria for permanent membership should include a comprehensive mix of elements, by order of importance: 1) political and economic power (and potential); 2) military force; 3) ability to undertake peacekeeping contributions at large scale; 4) population (more than 60 million persons); 5) contribution to the United Nations budget (more than 1,5% of UN's total budget); 6) capacity to contribute for the stability of economic system and power to invest abroad; 7) promotion of human rights (under the strict principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); 8) ability to contribute to humanitarian assistance; 9) and influence of civilization (as a qualitative element). The principle of equitable geographical distribution should be only considered as important if more than two candidates to new permanent members came from the same regional representation; in this case, as a criteria of exclusion (of the candidates).

The fourth step, under the supervision of the interagency committee, should establish minimum parameters for the U.S. and P-5 negotiating positions, such as: the conditions for the veto extension
to any new members and a limit to the total number of new members allowed within a certain period. The committee could also consider a Charter amendment to allow elected members to serve consecutive terms while aspirant countries work toward fulfilling road map criteria, and whether the UNSC expansion process should be linked to reforms of the wider UN structure (McDonald & Patrick, 2010).

If capably accomplished, UNSC expansion could be an investment in global stability. While the UNSC is not presently in crisis, there are persuasive practical and geopolitical grounds for the United States and the other permanent members to support a modest enlargement of its permanent membership. To complete its mandate the UNSC needs to draw on the collective authority and capabilities of many UN Member States. The United States and the P5 have an opportunity to shift the reform debate from one of entitlement to one of responsibility and action. Such an institutional bargain may appear at first magnanimous, but actually reflects enlightened self-interest (Ikenberry, 2001).

Conclusion

In history, however, the task of accommodating rising powers has been among the most difficult challenges of world politics. International relations tend to be particularly unstable when the global distribution of power changes and international structures fail to keep pace (Organski, 1958). The interwar period of 1919-1939 provides a case in point as one of particular turbulence in which no power maintained hegemony (Wittkopf & Kegley, Jr., 1997). For instance, while the League of Nations suffered from much debility, among the most crippling was the absence of major powers from the League Council during much of its history.

By spearheading reform that gives rising powers – as well as important established powers – a stake in the current world order, the United States can increase global political support for (or at least compliance to) existing arrangements and leverage the contributions of capable States willing to provide a larger share of global public goods (McDonald & Patrick, 2010). Yet, China and Russia regularly use the rules of liberal international institutions to delegitimize the United States’ actions. In the UNSC, they wielded their veto power to deny the West resolutions supporting the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and more recently, they have slowed the effort to isolate Syria. They occasionally work together in other venues, too, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although the Beijing-Moscow relationship is unimpressive compared with military alliances such as NATO, it’s remarkable that it exists at all given the long history of border friction and hostility between the two countries (Posen, 2013). As has happened so often in history, the common threat posed by a greater power has driven unnatural partners to cooperate (Ibid; Kennedy, 1987).

Whereas it is impossible to predict the future, failure to adjust the UNSC’s composition could well complicate multilateral security cooperation in the decades ahead. The direst scenario – that dissa-
tisfied Member States might launch a full-scale assault on the UNSC’s legitimacy and seek to undermine its role – seems unlikely (McDonald & Patrick, 2010). More plausible is that frustrated aspirants could reduce their investments in – and diplomatic support for – the institution, depriving the United Nations of necessary capabilities and reducing its overall effectiveness.

In the end, any effort to enlarge the UNSC will be difficult, but it will prove more challenging with time as power diffuses around the world and calls for increased reform. By acting now, the P5 can help harness the capabilities of new global actors and create incentives for their responsible behavior.

Appendix A: The Principal Coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group of Four (G4)</td>
<td>Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India</td>
<td>The G4 proposal (<a href="https://www.un.org/en/Docs/sc/2005/a59l64.pdf">A/59/L64, July 2005</a>) would increase the UNSC to twenty-five members by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members. Asia and Africa would receive two new permanent member seats apiece, and Latin/South America and Western Europe one seat each. New non-permanent seats would be given to Africa, Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin America. The proposal calls for veto rights for new permanent members, although the G4 offered to defer use of the veto for fifteen years, and pending a review conference to discuss the issue. The G4 comprises four democracies – two from the developed world and two from the developing world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniting for Consensus (UfC)</td>
<td>Led by G4 rivals: Mexico, Italy, South Korea, and Pakistan (plus, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, San Marino, Spain and Turkey)</td>
<td>The UfC proposal (<a href="https://www.un.org/en/Docs/sc/2005/a59l68.pdf">A/59/L68, July 2005</a>) would increase UNSC membership to twenty-five by adding ten non-permanent two-year seats. The twenty elected members would be based on regional representation, with six from Africa, five from Asia, four from the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries, three from the Western European and Others Group, and two from east European states. The UfC supports an “intermediate” solution of re-electable seats, without the prospect of permanent status. Membership of the UfC is reported as low as a dozen and as high as forty members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Africa Bloc (Ezulwini Consensus) Reflects the official position of the African Union

The African proposal (A/60/L41, December 2005) reflects the Ezulwini Consensus agreed upon by African heads of state in July 2005. It would increase the UNSC’s size to twenty-six members by adding six permanent and five non-permanent members. The new permanent members would be distributed consistent with the G4 scheme, but two new elected seats would go to Africa (rather than one), alongside one apiece to the Asian, east European, and Latin American regions. The proposal envisions full veto rights for all new permanent members.

Source: McDonald, K., & Patrick, S. (2010, Dec); General Assembly of the United Nations

Appendix B: List of UN Security Council Vetoes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Security Council - Veto List</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Research Guides & Resources.

1 The invasion of Iraq, led by the United States, on March 2003, was a multiple assault on the foundations and rules of the existing UN-centred world order. It called into question the adequacy of the existing institutions for articulating global norms and enforcing compliance with the demands of the international community (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006).
Appendix C: Evaluating the Main Aspirants to Permanent Membership (Veto Power):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>UN Membership Coalition</th>
<th>Population (Rank)</th>
<th>GDP1 (Rank)</th>
<th>Defense Spending (Rank)</th>
<th>Active Manpower (Rank)</th>
<th>FDI – Abroad (Rank)</th>
<th>Share of Contributions to UN Budget</th>
<th>UN Peace Operations 2013 (Rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>201 million (5)</td>
<td>USD 2.3 trillion (8)</td>
<td>US$bn 33.1 (11)</td>
<td>327,710 (14)</td>
<td>US$bn 182 (25)</td>
<td>1.611 % (14)</td>
<td>0.3222% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>506.8 million (3)</td>
<td>USD 15.9 trillion (1)</td>
<td>EUR$bn 194 (2)</td>
<td>1,668,537 (2)</td>
<td>US$bn 418 (1)</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>81.1 million (16)</td>
<td>USD 3.2 trillion (6)</td>
<td>US$bn 45.8 (9)</td>
<td>185,498 (33)</td>
<td>US$bn 1.7 (3)</td>
<td>8.018 % (3)</td>
<td>8.0180 % (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>1.2 Billion (2)</td>
<td>USD 4.7 trillion (4)</td>
<td>US$bn 46.1 (8)</td>
<td>1,325,000 (3)</td>
<td>US$bn 117.5 (28)</td>
<td>0.534 % (27)</td>
<td>0.1068 % (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>127.2 million (10)</td>
<td>USD 4.7 trillion (5)</td>
<td>US$bn 59.3 (5)</td>
<td>230,300 (22)</td>
<td>US$bn 1,049 (6)</td>
<td>12.530 % (2)</td>
<td>12.5300 % (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Africa Bloc</td>
<td>174.5 million (7)</td>
<td>445.5 (31)</td>
<td>US$bn 1.7 (55)</td>
<td>80,000 (39)</td>
<td>US$bn 11.24 (52)</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
<td>0.0156 % (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Africa Bloc</td>
<td>48.6 million (26)</td>
<td>USD 592 billion (26)</td>
<td>US$bn 3.7 (41)</td>
<td>62,082 (44)</td>
<td>US$bn 78.2 (30)</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
<td>0.0770 % (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The World Factbook, CIA; IISS Military Balance 2012; SIPRI; Eurostat; UN Peacekeeping; European Defence Agency

2 The gross domestic product (GDP) or value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year. GDP is usually described on PPP basis (Purchasing Power Parity). This is the measure most economists prefer when looking at per-capita welfare and when comparing living conditions or use of resources across countries.

3 The budget for UN Peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July 2012-30 June 2013 is about $7.33 billion [A/C.5/66/18] By way of comparison, this is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures (estimated at $1.753 billion in 2012).
### Table 2 – Political assessment: Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Member</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Decisive argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>- Major troop contributor to UN peace operations in the region</td>
<td>- Leader of G77 ideology in multilateral settings</td>
<td>Dominant power in Latin America and in the Southern Hemisphere; potential to become a world player. Besides, Brazil feels its position as a permanent member has been pending for too long, as it was originally entitled to it due to its esteemed position in the League of Nations. However, thanks to some ‘scheming’ by UK, the position went to France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Growing military capability</td>
<td>- Modest contributions to UN budget and peacekeeping budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong diplomatic core</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Established democracy</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rising power</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Dominant power in Latin America and in the Southern Hemisphere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Large population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>- World’s largest economy and investor</td>
<td>- The EU is not a fully-fledged UN member; it is only an observer member with right to speak, but not granted the right to vote</td>
<td>There is a continuing debate about whether there should be one permanent member for all of the European Union as opposed to individual European nations. However, there are no signs currently that France or the UK would be willing to renounce their standing to adopt this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Major contributor for humanitarian aid</td>
<td>- The extension of the EU’s role at the UN is politically sensitive among EU members (especially UK and Germany).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong military industry</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Large population</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promoter of human rights</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capacity to influence civilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>- Major contributor to UN budget and peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>- Political/historical constraints on use of force</td>
<td>Political/historical constraints on use of force versus good relations with all P5 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong diplomatic core</td>
<td>- Over-representation of Europe among P5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Established military industry and modern</td>
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</tbody>
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4 The Group of 77 was established on 15 June 1964 by 77 developing countries signatories of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries, which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development. At the moment, the G77 has 132 member countries. Fiji holds the Chairmanship for 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>- Major troop contributor to UN peace operations</td>
<td>- Leader of NAM and G77 ideology in multilateral settings</td>
<td>Ongoing border dispute with Pakistan, a Nuclear Weapon State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Growing military capability, including naval</td>
<td>- Limited contribution to UN regular budget and peacekeeping budget</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong diplomatic core</td>
<td>- Rival powers Pakistan and China</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Established democracy</td>
<td>- Ongoing border dispute</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fast-rising economy</td>
<td>- Non NPT party State</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Large population</td>
<td>- Uncontrolled growth of population; major social and humanitarian issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>- High share of assessed contributions to UN regular and peacekeeping budgets</td>
<td>- Modest military power in terms of capabilities'</td>
<td>Constitutional prohibition on war; and China, in particular, is not favorable of Japan's admission into the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong diplomatic core</td>
<td>- Constitutional prohibition on war</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Established democracy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic power</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>- Major troop contributor to UN and African Union peace operations</td>
<td>- Subscribes to NAM and G77 ideology in multilateral settings</td>
<td>Unstable/Weak State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regional leader</td>
<td>- Limited capacity of diplomatic corps</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Large African population</td>
<td>- Limited military force projection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Uncertain political future, given weak governance, instability, and conflict</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Weak economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>- Democracy (recent)</td>
<td>- Leader of NAM and G77 ideology in multilateral settings</td>
<td>The best African State candidate, however with a modest population; sustained regional power in question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Dominant regional leader</td>
<td>- Modest diplomatic corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promoter of nuclear disarmament talks</td>
<td>- Very modest military force projection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Modest population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Internal challenges of democratic consolidation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Council on Foreign Relations; Center for UN Reform Education; “The G-4 and Permanent Membership Reform in the Security Council”, Mount Holyoke College
End Notes:

1 U.N. Charter introductory note: article 23. Article 23 of the Charter, which concerns the composition of the Security Council, was amended on August 23, 1965. Overall, this provision enlarged the Council from eleven to fifteen members.


3 The African Group has three representatives, the Western European & Others Group (WEOG), the Latin American & Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and the Asian Group each has two representatives, while the Eastern European Group has one representative. Also one member of the UNSC should be an Arab country which can be chosen from the Asian or African groups.

4 For example, the government of Paul Martin, Canada advocated this approach.

5 Jus cogens (Latin form for “compelling law”) is a principle in international law. In brief, jus cogens refers to crimes generally accepted by the international community of States as unlawful, and from which no derogation is ever permitted. Although, no clear-cut definitions exist of what constitutes jus cogens, it is generally accepted that the term includes the prohibition of genocide, piracy, slavery, torture, and wars of territorial aggrandizement.

6 For further information, please see Appendix A.

7 The Republic of China (Taiwan) was replaced by the People’s Republic of China in 1971, the UNGA having adopted a resolution on “the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China,” and in 1991 it was acknowledged that the Successor State to the U.S.S.R. was the Russian Federation. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw fifteen new states gain membership in the United Nations.

8 The Cold War began immediately after the use of the atomic bombs over Japan, one month after the conclusion of the Charter conference, and endured for almost 50 years.

9 On February, 1945, during the Yalta Conference, Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt to join the United Nations, given the secret understanding of a voting formula with a veto power for permanent members of the Security Council, thus ensuring that each country could block unwanted decisions.

10 In this political allegory, using animals as representative of human types, it is observed that “all animals are equal but some are more equal than others.”

11 The application for membership by Palestine is the latest case in point.

12 Interestingly, on June 26, 1945, the Representative of Australia said of the proposed Permanent Members that they would have a double veto. He said such a UN member “can say not only I can veto the decision of the Council, but I will determine the question which I will veto” (UN Information Organizations, 1945).

13 This count excludes the paragraphs of draft resolutions or amendments thereto not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.

14 Comments made by Ambassador Kamal during the UNITAR course on Multilateral Policy June 17-21.

15 As an example of African countries’ stance, it can be refer to the comments of the delegate of the United Republic of Tanzania during a General Assembly debate on the reform of the Security Council on 1 November 1996. During that meeting, he called veto “undemocratic and irrelevant to the modern age” (GA/9151 available online at UN press archives).

16 It is noted that India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all have nuclear arsenals and are not P5 members.

17 But in recent years, the UNSC has spent comparatively less time rubber-stamping diplomatic agreements made outside its chambers and more time forging agreements within its own ranks – UNSC Resolution 1701 to end the Lebanon war and the P5+ Germany negotiations on Iran are all examples. The UNSC’s continued relevance is also illustrated by UN Member States’ desire to serve on it.

18 NAM is a group of states which are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. As of 2012, the movement has 120 members and 17 observer countries.

19 For instance, a change in UNSC composition would probably not address noncompliance by outlier states, like North Korea, Iran, or Syria.
1 UK could have a problem with his seat, if Scotland declares its independence after the 2014 referendum.  

1 For example, this could include reforms to create weighted voting in the UNGA and fifth budgetary committee, which might balance any dilution of U.S. power in the UNSC

1 Eugene R. Wittkopf explores past wars and their relation to Power Transition theory in his book World Politics: Trend and Transformation. According to Wittkopf, Portugal was the first power to assume a hegemonic position in world politics, in 1518. Nonetheless, as the Netherlands – which was experiencing the Dutch Golden Age – rose in power, a series of struggles led to the destruction of Spain’s power and a transition to Dutch hegemony. The Netherlands hegemony was brought into question again in 1688 with the Wars of Louis XIV, which resulted in what is referred to as the “Britain I Cycle”; later, the Napoleonic Wars interrupted this cycle and questioned the hegemony Britain possessed. However, Britain’s victory resulted in maintenance of power and the “Britain II Cycle”. This cycle ended with the World Wars. After the Second World War, a drastic increase in sea power concentration by the United States was experienced and it (along with the Soviet Union) became the world’s first superpowers.

Bibliography


Multilateralism and the existing enforcement mechanisms of the United Nations against the background of international Law

Moses Itene

Introduction

Multilateralism in the international relations context means multiple countries working in concert on a given issue(s). While the existing enforcement mechanisms under International Law are understood as the use of threat or force by States and the application of peaceful settlement of disputes, international law prohibits the use of threat and force in international relations. This is part of customary law and is contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prevents all members 'in their international relations from the use of threat or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'. The same United Nations Charter also recognizes the right to self-defense and empowers the United Nations Security Council to apply force when the need arises. Furthermore, other exceptions beside the United Nations Charter have sprung up under international law. These include: the application of force by peoples’ right to self-determination and a number of States justification for the use of force in the name of self-preservation with the presumption of legitimacy by international community.

Maintenance of international peace and security is the sole objective of the United Nations Organization. Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter, requires all members to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, and justice are not endangered". In the same vein, Article 3 enumerated various peaceful settlement mechanisms to serve as the uppermost resort in lieu of force or threat by arms. However, the definition of armed attacked was obviously significant in the Nicaragua case where Nicaragua and the counter case assertion of the United States allegedly involved support to the operation of irregular forces.

As a result, this paper will explore the existing enforcement mechanisms of the United Nations predicated in International Law in the light of conceptual enforcement mechanisms and practical enforcement mechanisms. This will invariably attract critical analysis of these mechanisms from which a deducible and reasoned conclusion will be sequentially and logically reached.
CONCEPTUAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Traditionally, the pacific means of peaceful resolution are categorized into two, namely: diplomatic-political procedures like inquiry, negotiation, mediation and conciliation, the outcome of which are not legally binding. And legal-adjudication procedures, arising from arbitration and litigation which result in binding decisions which can be applied in international law to determine rights. Any settlement reached in mediation and resolution will not be legally binding until it has been produced in writing and signed by, or on behalf of, the parties. "In legal doctrine, the principle that an arbitral award or judicial decision is binding upon the parties and must be carried out in good faith has been accepted without dissent".

The 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of war was axiomatically accepted and enthusiastically endorsed by the international community as a milestone for the attainment of peace. This treaty was the background for the formation of customary international law in the period prior to the emergence of the 1945 United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, this treaty has enormous lapses, as it does not contain sanctions against a State who break the pact by resulting to war nor does it has an efficient provision that prevent disputes.

A ‘dispute’ was explicitly defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1924 Mavrommatis case as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interest between two persons”. The Principle of peaceful resolution of disputes is the operational aim of the United Nations Organization. This is enshrined in the various United Nations conventions as well as being the cardinal principle of customary law.

Consequently, the International Court of Justice has considered negotiations as the basic means of dispute settlement. This was contained in the ICJ reports of North Sea Continental Shelf cases. Negotiations are aim to generate consensual result or resolution to a dispute. Such dispute resolution derives its legitimacy from consent and legitimacy is challenged by power disparities. However, all members of the United Nations are under unequivocal obligation to comply with the decisions of the International Court. This is categorically spelt out in Article 94 of the 1945 United Nations Charter.

The ‘internationality’ criterion of a dispute centers on the legal substance of the dispute. The concept of international disputes is neither restricted to disputes between states nor in the trans-border dimension. The general denominator explicitly or implicitly arising in international dispute is that an appeal is warranted as a means to harmonize an increasingly fragmented international jurisprudence and legal framework. ‘Implicit authorization’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ are the core issues that surround the doctrine of ‘preventive war’.

For the prevention of war, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and to ensure global security in line with Article 24. Further, Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the reality of any
“threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.” There may be some discrimination against an aggressor State where the law of neutrality is concerned.

Paramount on the issue of aggression, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter explicitly expresses that all UN members ‘shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations’. This prohibition is not only a UN provision but also doubles as a rule of customary international law, applicable to all States regardless of their membership of the UN. The mentions of the ‘the threat or use of force in this Article implies that all hostilities are considered even when war has not be formally declared.

On the clarification ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’, it was interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case to mean the prohibition of any use of force, when not even directed against territorial integrity or political independence of any State which is in conformity with the purposes of the UN such as humanitarian intervention.

**PRACTICAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

The international legal responsibility and humanitarian interventions constitute the practical enforcement mechanism of the United Nations. The role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the maintenance of international peace and security make its authorization of humanitarian interventions lawful. However, in a situation whereby a State and non-State actors are located, the State is neither responsible by the attacks launched by such non-State actors nor consensually agrees to the military intervention of the State target.

Arguably, it has been legally submitted that the right of a State to use force to protect its citizens abroad does not contravene Article 2(4) of the 1945 United Nations Charter in the following circumstances:

- *i when there is a threat of imminent injury or death to nationals;*
- *ii when a State in whose territory they are located is unwilling or unable to protect foreign nationals in danger;*
- *iii when the intervention of a State is exclusively confine to the rescuing of its nationals; and*
- *iv when there is a reasonable chance that the action will save more lives than it will destroy.*

Meanwhile, the aforementioned submission runs contrary to the strict interpretation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and is also in conflict with some of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions include: the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention
in Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty; and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Essentially, humanitarian intervention has been defined as ‘coercive interference in the internal affair of a State, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human right violations or preventing widespread human suffering’. This is in contradistinction to self-defense measure which must be taken as a last resort with the proportionality to the attack suffered.

Prior to the emergence of the United Nations Charter, the right of collective self-defense was generally accepted in international law. Exercise of collective right of self-defense is clearly express in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and explicitly outlined by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case as follows: ‘have declared itself to be under attack; and have requested the assistance of a third State’. In the same vein, the 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 made reference in its preamble by ‘affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter’.

However, in the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice rejected Israel’s argument of right to self-defense. It did not consider Israel’s construction of a lengthy barrier wall stretching hundreds of kilometers across certain areas of the West Bank as a non-violent measure necessary for the protection of Israeli citizens under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The ICC held that Article 51 recognizes only the existence of an inherent right to self-defense in the case of armed attack by one state against another. Moreover, it is the position of the International Court of Justice that any action taken in self-defense must be immediately reported to the United Nations Security Council.

With the end of the Cold War beginning in 1990 and the declination of the East-West tensions, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) became firm in the authorization of the deployment of military forces. This began after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1991 whereby the imposition of trade sanctions and forcible maritime interception of Iraq by the United Nations Security Council operation in defense of Kuwait.

In the early 1990’s the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) used military deployment to address wide spread human rights violations. This includes: the 1992 authorization of the US led coalition of States to intervene in Somalia to reopen food supply line; the 1993 authorization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use air campaign and power to secure six regional enclaves of Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the 1994 authorization of France intervention in Rwanda for the protection of civilians between the Hutus and Tutsis tribes; and the 1994 authorization of a US led coalition to oust a military coup d’état in Haiti and the restoration of its democratically elected President.
For practically ensuring peace, the United Nations General Assembly according to Article 11(3) and the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 99 will draw the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. In line with these provisions, Article 52 of the United Nations Charter supports the use of regional organizations to maintain and sustain international peace and security in conformity with the United Nations principles and upon the authorization of the Security Council as contain in Article 53.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the most recent sub-regional peace keeping and enforcement organization. ECOWAS was formed in the 1990 during the Liberia civil war which resulted in extensive and excessive refugees fleeing to neighboring countries. Such movement is inevitable and intermingling with combatants is sometimes unavoidable because of the exacerbation of the tide of battle. ECOWAS comprising of 16 West Africa States deployed multilateral military forces known as ECOMONG (Economic Community of West African States monitoring Group) to Liberia to quell the civil arm conflict that inflicted untold pains on Liberians. Initially, there was no express authorization of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia by the United Nations Security Council, although it was axiomatically accepted by the international community. Consequent, the United Nations Security Council authorized the ECOWAS peace keeping operation in Liberia in Resolution 788 (1992).

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Obviously, the international legal operation is ‘replete with partial overlaps of substantive and procedural rules and bodies competing for “supremacy”’. Concerning the satisfactory assessment of the existing enforcement mechanisms of the United Nations, a holistic approach to international law safe from the isolated refinements to the law, need a conceptual distinction between legality and legitimacy.

March 1999 saw the first recorded time in history that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was used to apply maximum military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over the province of Kosovo without any such authorization from the United Nations Security Council authorization. Indisputably, NATO has the United Nations legality to maintain international peace and security; as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has its territorial legitimacy. In this case scenario, the legality of NATO and the legitimacy of Yugoslavia which take precedence in international law. “International law does not exist in the abstract”, instead it is what states make of it and it is both desirable as the criterion of democratic legitimacy and the application of absolute legal realism.

The contention of NATO legality and Yugoslavia legitimacy for attention necessitate the call for the redefinition of the concept of aggression. What constitutes aggression is a question of the United Nations Security to determine. Aggression is a subjective concept that maybe influenced by political or ideological interest.
Since the inception of the United Nations Organization, it has deployed sixty peacekeeping operations internationally as at 2007, with pending of fifteen in places like Congo, Cyprus, Georgia, Haiti, Kosovo, the Middle East and Sudan. Obviously, there are enormous difficulties in obtaining the United Nations Security Council authorization for peacekeeping operations. Added to this is the high cost of maintaining an approved international peace and security operations. As a result, the International Court of justice in a Certain Expenses case, held that expensive connected with the peace keeping in the Middle East and the Congo were appropriately expenses of the United Nations.

Based on the difficulties associated in getting authorization for international peacekeeping and its attendant cost, the ultimate way for realization of peace between two deputing States is bilateral solutions. These difficulties are quite disquieting, but this does not mean that the act of approximating proportionality is 'left solely to the unfettered discretion of the combatants.

The bilateral solution approach between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China over the US Navy EP -3E ARIES II signal intelligence aircraft and China J-8II interceptor fighter jet that resulted in an international dispute known as the Hainan Island incident in China on April 1 2001, purports and supports this truism. Observably, military advantage is not restricted to tactical or local gains, it also has diplomatic benefit. Similarly, the Cameroonian-Nigerian Bakasi border dispute case characterized by international complexity and ambiguity which was decided by the International Court of justice (ICJ) in favor of Cameroon on October 10, 2002 was nevertheless accepted by Nigeria for the purposes of peace and bilateral agreements Nigeria had with Cameroon.

CONCLUSION

International dispute settlement through the advancement of peaceful mechanisms remains fundamental in maintaining the fabric of the international legal order and the reflection of the desire of States and non-State actors. To effectively resolve differences between States international legal mechanisms must be consequentially procedural and devoid of complexity associated with judicial settlement methods like arbitration and extra-legal means, which includes international organizations, judicial inquiry, and ombudsmen.

For the enforcement of effective mechanisms in hostilities, it should be acknowledged that drawing a line of demarcation between inter-State and intra-State armed conflicts is not as simple as it seems. There are amorphous circumstances in which case the two categories of conflicts are intertwined, either spatially horizontal or temporally vertical. Imperatively, conflict of interest in the form of impartiality, legitimacy, independence accountability and transparency are disturbing re-occurring concerns confronting adjudicative organs and processes of effective enforcement mechanisms under Public international Law.
Judging from this perspective, it would not be conceivable to stay limited to the textual interpretation of Article 2(4) or Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and not even the Resolution 2625 or 3314 of the United Nations General Assembly for the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance of international peace and security. For it is easier to thoroughly examine a situation in the light of comparable precedents rather than reference to fixed and disembodied texts. Broadly speaking, extensive approach seems to move beyond the formalism of treaty texts in terms of viewing them in relation to the particular factual circumstances of an arising case. At the same time, autonomy of law does not imply independence. It presupposes the creation of interpretation and inevitability of value judgment.

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The Responsibility to Protect in the Context of the Syrian Civil War

Tom McGee

Introduction
When protests against Bashar al-Assad’s rule began in the Syrian city of Deraa in March 2011, few people could have predicted the extent of the violence which would follow. Over two years have elapsed since then and the conflict has escalated into a full-blown civil war. Despite numerous reports of human rights violations from organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the international community has been unable - or unwilling - to offer a solution. While the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Assad regime in May 2013, little tangible help has been forthcoming. This may appear surprising since the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), conceived of at the beginning of the 21st century, was intended to offer a blueprint for preventing or halting Mass Atrocity Crimes. Furthermore, on a superficial level, there are many parallels between the Libyan Revolution of 2011 and the on-going Syrian conflict. However, in the case of Libya, R2P played an important part in justifying NATO’s intervention, whereas in Syria the international community have not taken action.

In order to explain this inconsistency in the application of R2P, it is important to explain precisely what the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm advises. Indeed, R2P is nuanced and does not advocate indiscriminate intervention at the expense of a country’s sovereignty. It is necessary to examine, too, why some commentators believe R2P’s use would have been appropriate for the Syrian Civil War yet why no military action has actually taken place. Finally, it will be concluded that R2P was weakened from its inception by trying to reconcile the sometimes contradictory principles of sovereignty and protection of human rights. When we also consider that relations between the great powers are tense and disagreement is common, it becomes clear that R2P has reached a crucial junction in its bid to remain relevant and respected.

The history of the Responsibility to Protect
It is impossible to understand R2P without appreciating the historical context in which it was written. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which compiled the R2P report between 2000 and 2001, was haunted by the events of the 1990s. External military intervention to protect humans at risk of Mass Atrocity Crimes had provoked fierce debate when it did take place but when it did not, and the world turned a blind eye, the consequences could be devastating. Doubts about the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (the UN Security Council refused to authorise the use of force) led to strong criticism. At the other end of the spectrum, the reluctance to act in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 meant that hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were slaughtered. These events, coupled with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and the disastrous UN presence in Somalia, demonstrate that the international community struggled to know when, how and whether it was appropriate to intervene in countries for the
safety of its population. Therefore, spurred on by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s imporing “how should we respond...to gross and systematic violations of human rights”, the ICISS produced its report. However, providing a clearly-defined framework for a notion as morally ambiguous as R2P proved a challenge. We must view the crises in Libya and Syria as important tests for R2P which is still in its infancy.

Analysis of the Report on the Responsibility to Protect

An important principle which underpins the entire report is that a state’s sovereignty is not without limits. Indeed, with sovereignty comes great responsibility; a state must demonstrate that it deserves its sovereignty by protecting its citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The responsibility to protect belongs, first and foremost, to the state concerned. The second pillar of R2P acknowledges that the international community should assist the state in protecting its people. The international community will not get directly involved unless the state neglects its responsibility to protect its population. In this eventuality, the third pillar of R2P is invoked and solutions including peaceful negotiations, economic sanctions and military intervention are explored. It is explicitly stated that military intervention should be considered only as a last resort.

The measures which a situation must satisfy in order for military intervention to occur are rigorous, thereby demonstrating that intervention is rarely desired yet occasionally required. The intervention should be for a just cause, there must be right intention behind the military action, it ought to employ proportional means and have reasonable prospects of success. It is noteworthy that these criteria are open to interpretation. A ‘just cause’ and the ‘right intention’ are inherently subjective and, consequently, liable to being interpreted as the major powers see fit. Indeed, the influence of the various vested interests of the international community will become a recurring element of this paper. This is already evident in the decisive principle for military intervention: “right authority”. Only UN Security Council can authorise such intervention but due to the deep divisions in the UNSC, the “right authority” is often difficult to obtain. And it was the ability to get the UNSC’s approval which sets the Libyan example apart from Syria. Why was this the case?

The similarities between the Libyan and Syrian situations

NATO’s deployment to Libya in March 2011 was initially seen as a vindication of R2P. UNSC Resolution 1973 reiterated “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and this was believed to offer proof that R2P was a valuable tool in regulating military intervention. Given the notable similarities between Libya of 2011 and Syria, it might have been assumed that by following the strict R2P protocol again, intervention in Syria on humanitarian grounds could be authorised. It can be seen why this was a logical assumption: both Arab countries were witnessing clashes between dynasties that had ruled for forty years and a broad group of protesters. In Libya and Syria, the protests were against decades of corruption, oppression and government brutality. In both cases, the protests rapidly escalated, with Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi vowing to “cleanse the city of Benghazi” and Assad labelling his opponents “terrorists”. The systematic shooting of protesters, the indiscriminate shelling of civilians, torture and sexual violence were all carried out in Libya and Syria. Not only were the regimes neglecting their responsibility to protect, they were instigating the atrocities.
Moreover, the circumstances in both Libya and Syria seemed to fulfil the majority of the R2P criteria. Diplomatic tools were rapidly exhausted: the Arab League suspended Libya and Syria in 2011. Economic sanctions were also imposed, but to no avail. This left military intervention as the last resort. The UNSC Resolution 1973 of March 2011 was passed, allowing member states to take “all necessary measures” in Libya. However, while it was believed that the R2P precedent of Libya might facilitate intervention in Syria, it did the opposite. UNSC Resolution 1973 has a strong humanitarian focus. It condemns “the gross and systematic violation of human rights”, it aims to “ensure the protection of civilians” and wishes to protect “civilian populated areas under threat of attack”. It intends to do this by establishing a “ban on all flights”: not once is regime change suggested. The resolution even goes so far as to reaffirm “its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence...of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” By ousting Qaddafi, the NATO intervention far overstepped its UN mandate. This had two dangerous consequences; it broke important R2P principles; and alienated Russia and China, both veto-wielding Permanent Members of the Security Council. The Responsibility to Protect report is at pains to underline that for military intervention “a clear and unambiguous mandate” is a prerequisite and that the objective is “protection of a population, not defeat of a state.” Neither of these was respected by NATO. So, the use – or rather, misuse – of R2P in Libya gravely tainted R2P in the eyes of Russia and China, countries which staunchly oppose international intervention.

**Reasons why R2P was not used in Syria**

**Russia and China**

The inappropriate use of R2P in Libya provided Russia and China with a convenient excuse for opposing future Western intervention. Nevertheless, even if NATO had not damaged the perception of R2P, it is highly likely that China, and especially Russia, would have vetoed any resolutions urging military action in Syria. This can be explained by their profound vested interests they have in Assad’s Syria.

Neither Russia nor China had supported the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya and both countries abstained in the Security Council vote. They preferred to use their veto when a matter truly threatened their national interests; this matter was Syria. Between October 2011 and July 2012, the Security Council discussed three resolutions concerning Syria. All three were vetoed by both Russia and China. In 2011, China became Syria’s largest trading partner. In addition, it depends on Syria for oil. Syria has signed contracts for Russian weapons worth billions of dollars. Syria is also vital for Russia due to its geopolitical importance; if NATO-backed military intervention ousts Assad, Russia’s influence in the Middle East will greatly diminish. Ruslan Pukhov, a Russian defence analyst, explains that Assad’s Syria “follows our advice...we can exercise certain tangible influence”. Furthermore, Slobodan Milosevic’s fall in 2000 and Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004 have made Russia increasingly suspicious of the USA and the West assisting the overthrow of governments deemed ‘unsuitable’. The Kremlin sees Syria as a zero-sum game; if Assad falls, Russia’s loss is the West’s gain. Thus, Russia and China were loath to authorise external military action in Syria because R2P is a “fundamentally political act”. Regardless of how noble and well-intentioned R2P is, it was impossible for the Syrian crisis to be considered in a political vacuum. This is supported by Mark Lyall Grant’s (UK ambassador to the UN) criticism that Russia and China had “chosen to put their national interests ahead of the lives of millions of Syrians”. Ultimately, then, the success of R2P depends on the whims of the major world powers.
The West

Indeed, even though Russia and China receive the blame for obstructing military intervention in Syria, the Western powers should not be entirely absolved. The agenda of the USA and Europe meant that action in Libya was far more desirable than in Syria. Despite the humanitarian terms employed in the UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya, the West intervened because it was in their own best interests. There were possible economic benefits; Libya has the fifth largest oil reserves in the world and might offer opportunities for profitable post-conflict reconstruction. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, acknowledged that a civil war in Libya, a country on the doorstep of Europe, posed a security risk to the continent. Nicolas Sarkozy, the then French President, wanted to appear authoritative and statesmanlike with an election due in 2012. So, it is clear that the West’s actions in Libya were not merely an altruistic, humanitarian statement. They were mainly motivated by self-interest and not by their willingness to fulfill the R2P protocol.

The situation in Syria, on the other hand, means that intervention is far from desirable. Despite the superficial similarities with Libya, mentioned above, the two countries are in fact drastically different. While Qaddafi was a political pariah and diplomatically isolated, the Assad regime is fiercely supported by Iran and the Lebanese party-cum-militia Hizbullah. This means that any intervention in Syria might provoke a regional war. Syria is a much more heterogeneous society than Libya, comprising Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Christians and Druze. The sectarian nature of the conflict means that intervention is a complex proposition. Essentially, the West has no stomach for conflict and does not want to take action. Yet they will not admit to this, preferring instead to make Russia and China scapegoats for the world’s failure to act. The lack of a legitimate UN mandate did not prevent the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when it suited the US and UK to intervene.

R2P is greatly weakened by its reliance on Security Council authority. This makes it a hostage to the “political and moral corruption of the permanent members of the UNSC”. The success of R2P is damaged by the double standards which pervade the international community or, as French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy expressed it, “will France do for Houla and Homs what she has done for Benghazi and Misrata?” Thus, while R2P and humanitarian concerns may be the official justifications for military intervention, it is probable that the real motives lie in the vested interests of the world’s dominant powers, more specifically, the P5. As it has been cynically expressed, “whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat”.

The future of R2P

Following the scrutiny which R2P has received during the handling of the Libyan and Syrian cases, it is worth considering what role R2P will play in the future. Evidently, if the Security Council is unwilling to intervene, the entire structure of R2P becomes worthless, no matter how grave the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the concept of the ‘responsibility not to veto’ (RN2V) proposes that the P5 do not use their vetoes to block action in response to mass atrocities. There are many obstacles to this suggestion; most particularly that the P5 are unlikely to want to curb the power of their veto. Additionally, the qualifying of situations as ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ is contentious. Nonetheless, in order to restore some faith in R2P, a restriction on veto use is important. This will not mean a massive proliferation of unwarranted military interventions as the rigorous
R2P intervention criteria will still have to be fulfilled. But it will mean that the selfish interests of the P5 will not impede the protection of those at risk. Indeed, it is not fair that the interests of very few dictate the fates of many.

Many of R2P’s problems – such as obtaining the authority for intervention – are concerned with the halting of mass atrocity crimes. However, some of these problems might be averted if the international community placed even greater focus on preventing the occurrence of atrocity crimes in the first place. The ICISS report refers to this as the “responsibility to prevent” which aims to deal with the causes of conflict and man-made crises. By implementing early warning mechanisms and compiling weekly and monthly reports of ‘fragile’ countries which face particular risks, prevention can be improved. As a consequence, military intervention as a last resort would be required less frequently.

Since its inception, R2P has been fighting a difficult battle. It has been viewed with suspicion by some countries because it states that “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”. This does not fit with Russia’s interpretation of sovereignty. Russia believes that sovereignty grants governments an unlimited licence to act as they wish within their country. Moreover, following R2P’s abuse in Libya, there are fears that R2P will be perceived as a tool for Western expansionism. The crises in Libya and Syria presented an opportunity to show that R2P could be a force for good. The opposite happened. Therefore, if R2P remains as it is and the UNSC remains divided, its future is not optimistic.

Conclusion

The discrepancy in the use of R2P in Libya and Syria highlighted a trend which has existed since the UN’s creation and indeed since the League of Nations: the world powers place their national interests above all other considerations. However, the UN’s neutrality is vital, and the self-serving nature of its member states compromises the organisation’s impartiality. The consequences of this are particularly stark when military intervention for humanitarian purposes is being discussed. The Security Council deemed the Libyan citizens worthy of protection but not the people of Syria. It is very difficult to justify this “moral asymmetry”. The Responsibility to Protect is a valiant attempt at solving a near-intractable problem. It tries to juggle the conflicting principles of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Its three pillars and the very high threshold required for intervention reveal that the ICISS tried to make military action a last resort and provided many alternatives. However, in some instances, as in Libya and Syria, military intervention is the only remaining solution. In this case, the success of the R2P protocol is at the mercy of the Security Council.
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The Post-2015 Agenda: Narrowing the Gender Gap in the Technology Revolution

Tara Catanach

The 2013 UNITAR Summer School on International Diplomacy introduced the structure of the United Nations, explored current pressing security and humanitarian issues and examined the realities, faults and room for growth in the international system. Sessions involved Syrian policy debates, recounting of individual stories from UN missions and tips on public speaking and diplomacy. Included in these discussions was a presentation on The World We Want 2015 campaign. This project is a platform created by the UN and civil societies to allow for greater dialogue in relation to the development process, with over 630,000 individuals expressing their views worldwide. The data has been stratified to highlight regional priorities and socio-economic classifications within a country. The project aims to influence national level policies and positions that diplomats will bring to the United Nations when creating the Sustainable Development Goals of the post-2015 agenda. One of the statistical observations gathered through The World We Want 2015 is that 90% of the surveys submitted through SMS from developing countries were sent in by males. This observation highlights the severe gender gap in the technology revolution in developing countries. As the international community designs the Post-2015 Agenda, it should strive to lessen the gender gap in the technology revolution throughout developing countries in order to boost economies, alleviate poverty, and work towards gender equality in society as well as the workplace.

ICTs, or Information Communication Technology, possess a great capacity to aid in the alleviation of poverty, promote the development of good governance, improve education, highlight human rights abuses, and empower women. Internet use and communication technology (including radio, computers, cell phones and television) is revolutionizing development and life in developing nations by increasing communication capabilities, enhancing marketing and businesses, spreading information on crop prices, and enabling secure payments for goods and services through technology. The access to products and markets have been widely expanded by ICTs, in turn increasing demand and competition, and energizing the economies of developing nations. Through the use of ICTs, a small travel agency in a developing nation can advertise their services, a new
business can receive microfinance loans, and a high school student can access research articles and statistics published by universities or institutions such as the United Nations. Cell phones can be used to send mass messages to citizens concerning public health and the spread of disease (with an emphasis on HIV/AIDS). As technology shrinks our world, it expands opportunity for development.

Paired with this great potential for development and improvement, is the reality that women are often excluded from the technology revolution in developing nations. Sixteen percent fewer women than men use the Internet in developing countries. This gender gap is also evident in the fact that “women in sub-Saharan Africa are 24 percent less likely than men to own a mobile phone. And in South Asia, it’s 37 percent less likely”.

Providing equal access for women to ICTs is definitely the ethical policy, but is it the shrewd policy? The answer is yes. Basic business statistics show that investing in women’s education and expanded economic involvement offers incredible returns. For example, research by USAID concludes that “when 10 percent more girls go to school, a country’s GDP increases on average by 3 percent”. Women Deliver found that “credit extended to women increases household consumption about twice as much as men’s borrowing”. In most cases, investing in a woman is equivalent to investing in her entire family and thereby multiplies the effect. Women have been proven, time and time again, to be, when given the opportunity, key drivers in economy. In China, women own 20 percent of all small businesses and 20 percent of those businesses employ over a thousand workers. If female farmers had access to the same seeds, equipment, and irrigation as male farmers, they could increase their crop yields 20 to 30 percent and feed up to an additional 150 million hungry people.

These statistics point the United Nations, national governments and NGOs in the clear direction of combining two great catalysts to economic and social profitability: women and technology. It is not only the right policy to pursue; it is the smart policy to pursue. In order to pursue sustainable development, it is key to arm women and existing women run businesses with ICTS as well as train women and girls with the skill set needed to use these ICTS and excel in an economy driven by them. By ensuring this opportunity of equal exposure to the data revolution, women can compete in, thrive and drive local and international markets.

The first step of narrowing the gender gap in the digital world is to gather more statistical information about women around the world. As explained by former United States Secretary of State Hilary, Clinton, at the Conference titled Evidence and Impact: Closing the Gender Gap, “for too many countries we lack reliable and regular data on even the basic facts about the lives of women and girls...and since women make up half the population, that’s like having a black hole at the center of our data-driven universe”. It is incredibly difficult to tackle any issues without sufficient data. Therefore the first step should be to gather gender-sensitive data about women’s livelihood and their relationship with emerging technologies and ICTs. Analyzing these statistics will be useful in conceptualizing not only the gender gap but also gender inequality, sexual violence, poverty rates, and several other areas that lack significant quantitative data on women. Once this data is collected
and analyzed, the international community, national governments, and non-governmental organizations can better develop policies and programs to reduce the gender gap.

Following collection and analysis of data, national and international programs that increase technological exposure to women need to be instituted. A prominent example of a policy aimed at reducing the gender gap in the technological world is the Technology for Women in Business program implemented in South Africa in 1998. The purpose of this program is to provide increased access to technology to existing women run businesses as well as expose young women and girls in school to careers in science and technology. Programs like this can be enhanced across the globe by teaching girls in the secondary level of education to code and become familiar with programming, an incredibly valued skill set in the job market. By either teaching girls these skills or providing access to free websites such as Girls Who Code which provides the basics to coding, women can become more involved in technology based markets, help to drive their economies and thereby create better and more inclusive, sustainable growth.

In Kenya, The Women’s Voice Project provides camera equipment and video editing training seminars to local women in Kibera, Africa’s largest urban slum with a growing population of approximately half a million people. The women then used these cameras to film and compile short documentaries about the challenges, aspirations and opinions of Kenyan women living within Kibera. Through this project, women were not only able to acquire video production skills, but they were given a voice; a voice by which they could express concerns to their government and provide their own rare perspective. This project helped Kenyan women delve into the realm of technology and in the process provided them with a means for greater participation in society and government by being able to voice their concerns. It is time for the womens’ voices to be heard. By providing access to technology to women in developing countries, the international community can narrow the technology gap, generate sustainable growth in the economy and, in cases like Kibera, Kenya, offer women the ability to participate as citizens and have their voices heard.

The International Community faces a stark reality: the gender gap is prevalent throughout developing countries and particularly in the context of the data revolution. Statistics have proven that women, when given the opportunity, can be catalysts for the growth of their local economy. Data has also proven that technology, specifically Information Communication Technology, can help to drive businesses to the next level. Therefore, to help alleviate poverty and promote gender equality, the international community should focus on, when developing the Post-2015 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, narrowing the technology gap between men and women in developing countries. This goal can be pursued increasing women’s exposure to technology and ICT skills. An increased exposure holds the potential to help develop women’s businesses (thereby developing the nation’s economy), give women a voice in policy making, and ultimately narrow the gender gap in the data revolution.
End Notes:

4 ibid.
13 http://www.girlswhocode.com
The Importance of Multilateral Diplomacy in Creating a Sustainable Global Economic Model

Charles McConnell

The world is full of disheartening paradoxes, scary truths, and disappointing attempts at resolving these issues. A few that stand out are as follows: the earth is currently at a 150% annual depletion rate, yet we have a rapidly rising global population; there are some people that make over 50 million dollars a year while many more people live on one dollar per day; there are rising sea levels that will potentially wipe small island states from our earth and greatly damage coastlines of other states. These few facts don’t necessarily have much in common with each other, but they do have one extremely important commonality: they are global issues. It is time that problems are no longer dealt with on a state-by-state basis, but rather on a global level. It is time that organizations like the United Nations are given the proper authority to carry out important missions throughout the world to ensure the survival of human beings everywhere. The United Nations have made a reasonable start with the Millennium Development Goals, and they hope to continue their success with the Sustainable Development Goals and post-2015 agenda.

Within this agenda comes one more paradox—one that this paper will attempt to tackle with a concrete plan—that really encapsulates many of the problems facing the world today. In a broad sense, the agenda wants to accomplish many things, four of which seem to contradict each other: the UN hopes to decrease mortality rates, yet they hope to deal with the rising population issue, and they are trying to stop the depletion of the earth while promoting development in many countries. There are some glaring issues here, however, if we take a look at history or just think about this logically. We can group these four issues into two groups, as dealing with a rising global population goes hand-in-hand with stopping the depletion of the earth and decreasing mortality rates—in many cases among women and children—goes hand-in-hand with promoting development. These two groups clash with each other, however, and it is an important paradox that must be dealt with going forward. The importance of multilateral diplomacy in dealing with
climate change and creating a sustainable development global economic model cannot be overstated.

Going forward, multilateral diplomacy must be at the forefront of the charge in dealing with many issues facing our world, but especially the issues of the above paradox—one that can be simplified into stopping the depletion of the earth while combating a rapidly rising population. Within this framework, there are countless other topics that can and will be addressed by states and the United Nations. This issues range from healthcare to education to clean water etc. It is the issue of climate change and preventing the depletion of the earth that is arguably the most important issue facing the world today. When all is said and done, at the end of the day there is just one earth. There is no backup plan for if the earth fails. There are no do-overs. That said, the people of earth need to do everything they can to protect her climate.

There are several reasons why bilateral diplomacy will not be nearly as effective as multilateral diplomacy going forward. “The object of bilateral negotiation is to resolve an issue that cannot be solved unilaterally, through one’s own actions. Engagement in negotiation almost implies a willingness to achieve a compromise;[2] somewhere between one’s own maximum goal and the absolute minimum that one is willing to accept.” (Rana 1) Bilateral negotiations historically and contemporarily have been a means to an end for each state achieving something in their best interest. As can be seen in the realist school of thought, states will always look after their own interests first. Their national security and prosperity trumps any notion of global prosperity and security. This is problematic going forward for many reasons. Unlike with war or trade, climate change is a global issue. While war and trade relations can have an effect on many different states, issues like the global depletion rate will have an effect on all states. Thus, bilateral diplomacy breaks down, as everyone will not have the same interests in mind when arriving to the negotiating table.

“The growing importance of multilateral diplomacy is a phenomenon of the 21st century. This is in part because the 21st century has thrown up problems which are universal in nature, such as human rights, the international control of disease, the international flow of capital and information, humanitarian assistance, labour rights, trade, national environmental issues with transnational fall-out and environmental issues of an international nature.” (Cockburn 1) As Cockburn states, there is a newfound importance to multilateral diplomacy in the 21st century. The United Nations and many other global institutions have been created to address specific problems, and it is through the evolution of human interaction that these institutions have had to take on a greater role. The UN’s original purpose was to maintain global security and protect the sovereignty of every state.
In simple terms, the United Nations was created to prevent World War III. In that regard, it has succeeded, but over the last several decades, the United Nations has fought on behalf of states to create a global discussion that would lead to solutions for a wide array of problems.

While the Charter has remained unchanged, the role of the UN changes with the wind. During the 90s, their main goal was to prevent genocide; during parts of the 2000s, one of their main goals was to tackle the growing issue of piracy off the Somali coast; today one of their main goals is to help foster a global atmosphere where sustainable development can occur.

The United Nations—if nothing else—stands as the beacon for multilateralism in the world today. There are flaws with the UN—the Security Council may need reform to deal with the veto power of the Security Council; the charter may be outdated; many argue that states like the USA will do what they want regardless of the UN’s mandates, etc. Underneath many of the shortcomings of the United Nations, however, stands steadfast support for multilateralism as defined by many: “Newman et al, state that multilateralism refers to collective, cooperative action by states—when necessary, in concert with non-state actors—to deal with common challenges and problems when these are best managed collectively at the international level.” (Cockburn 1) Getting back to the paradox and the crux of this paper, the importance of multilateral diplomacy cannot be stressed enough.

Decreasing global mortality rates might seem like an issue of states, but it has truly become a transnational issue. In parts of Africa, conflicts and wars in certain countries create spillovers into other countries. Within these refugee populations, there are very high rates of mortality, especially among children without access to clean water or food sources. The same is true throughout the world. As globalization has occurred, issues that typically are the concern of each state individually have become increasingly global by nature. Decreasing global mortality rates, therefore, is an issue that is perfectly suited for the United Nations and handled in a multilateral manner.

Since decreasing global mortality rates will by nature increase global populations, the paradox begins to come to fruition when looking at the second issue in our paradox—dealing with and managing the rapidly rising global population. The United Nations released figures lately that are eye opening. The global population within the next century will rise to about 12 billion people at its peak. (Fisher) Some estimates are higher and some are lower, but all agree it will be significantly higher than the current global population. Where the population growth will take place, however, is cause for concern. Africa, many argue, is on the verge of a population explosion that they are most definitely not capable of
handling. This population boom will almost entirely be sub-Saharan in a world of undeveloped states, resource conflicts, recent genocides, and a rampant AIDS epidemic. Of these states, the United Nations predicts that by 2100 Nigeria will be on the verge of becoming the third billion-person country in the world. (Fisher) This is definitely a reason for concern.

Moving on, India is on pace to surpass China’s population by 2030. (Fisher) Anyone that has spent time in India will agree that this is concerning as well. Pollution rates there are extraordinary. Poverty can be seen in all major cities and regions at an alarming level, and they are not managing with their current population levels. Moving to the developed world, there is a trend in the opposite direction. Aside from the United States, many developed countries will shrink, such as Japan and Germany—two of the most powerful economies in the world. While this isn’t necessarily a bad thing, the fact that the developed nations will remain stagnant or shrink at a time when developing countries are on the verge of a population explosion is problematic. Without concrete steps to make sure that countries can develop in a sustainable nature, the global gap between the rich and poor will only increase over the next 90 years. As history shows, eventually the poor get fed up, and it will only be a matter of time before the United Nations and the many other transnational institutions collapse—if nothing is done of course. It is here, dealing with this population issue, that the importance of multilateralism can be seen the most. Using concrete measures outlined by the Millennium Development Goals and furthered by the Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations must lead the charge to ensure that these rapidly increasing populations have access to clean water, healthcare, and other basic human needs to avoid a catastrophic end.

Without delving into specifics, there is one main statistic that the United Nations needs to help improve globally to adequately deal with the changing global population levels—decreasing the “dependency ratio” of every state in the world. “The ‘dependency ratio’ is the ratio of people under age 15 or over age 64 to the number of people age 15 to 64.” (Fisher) This ratio will balance out throughout the world if conflicts are avoided. Conflicts in Africa, for example, have typically taken the lives of men ages 15 to 30. Thus, when the conflict finally comes to an end, there is a gap that is felt by the entire society. Without conflicts, many African nations will be able to finally have this important demographic within their societies. Thus, the United Nations will need to play an active role in minimizing conflicts throughout the world.

The third and fourth issues of the paradox can be addressed together. The depletion rate is too high. 150% is an unsustainable number for the depletion of the earth. Ideally the rate
would be around 80-90% so the Earth can replenish itself each year and more. There are obviously many ways to deal with this problem by itself—curb carbon dioxide emissions, prevent deforestation, find clean energy forms, impose sanctions on states that violate certain pollution levels etc. The paradox shows its face again, however, since the United Nations also hopes to promote development at least to the point where states can sustain the rising population levels. Historically, as can be seen through the Industrial Revolution, development means pollution—it means ramping up production through any means necessary to create a strong domestic economy and infrastructure. Up until now, this has meant a high usage of coals and other unclean energy forms to build up a country to the point where it is “developed.” Here is where multilateralism and the United Nations can be ultimately the most effective. The United Nations needs to lead the charge in bringing countries together to share technological advances so that countries can develop in a clean way. Discouraging development would be detrimental to the world, but encouraging development without thinking about pollution levels, health risks, and the overall global climate would also be detrimental. It is only the United Nations that can take a step back and try and find a place in the middle. Hopefully, through summits and negotiations between states from all regions of the world, the United Nations can do this.

As can be seen through the Kyoto Protocol, multilateral diplomacy can work effectively to deal with certain issues that face the world. The issues going forward—almost entirely attributed to rapidly rising population levels in undeveloped or underdeveloped states—will be more difficult to deal with, but it is important to note that bilateral diplomacy will not be adequate in many cases. Bilateral diplomacy is not completely outdated, but through bodies like the United Nations, there are now multilateral ways to solve global problems effectively. There are reasons to be pessimistic about the world, and the issues facing our world may prove to be too tough to deal with, but as long as multilateralism is an option, human beings must use it. They must put aside their national interests for a second and think about the human race. At the end of the day, what does national security mean when the human race is in danger?
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Governing By Global People

By SooJin Song (University of Delaware)

In global governance (GG), the emergence and privileges of new actors (particularly non-state actors) have raised the question of whether the presence of non-state actors poses a challenge to state sovereignty. A possible answer can be found in the concept of a Global Civil Society (GCS). Robert O’Brien (2005) defines GCS as “...an arena or space where civic actors attempt to influence the way in which people live their lives around the world‖. Using his definition, I will discuss how GG recognizes these new supranational actors and groups in GCS. I agree with Lipschutz in arguing that these new types of actors are the building blocks of GCS for global politics to develop governance globally by using instutitive and productive powers in their global practices (Lipschutz, 2005). While these new rising actors in GCS might not threaten or challenge the state's sovereignty, they can transform the concepts of sovereignty that are recognized as the structure of the relationships between individuals, states, and international organizations (IOs) with GCS rather than challenging the traditional meaning of sovereignty.

Since 2000, the United Nations (UN) practiced this new phenomenon of global relations between various actors through the UN Global Compact (GC). The GC has 10 principles to guide private actors’ business behaviors. This new global practice will reduce conflicts between state and non-state actors. Each actor will learn better GG through their relations. In this paper, I will focus on 1) why we consider non-state actors in global relations, 2) how the GC helps each actor to practice global governance in managing and making policy, and 3) what challenges face the GC in this new stage of global relations.

The various non-state actors in the GCS are international interest groups focused on particular issues and problems that cannot be resolved at the state level to meet their people’s private and public needs. Thakur and Langenhove (2006) attribute these peripheral issues — environmental degradation, human trafficking, terrorism, and nuclear weapons — to the lack of the state's vision and will to govern. In the GCS, civic actors try to work with these peripheral issues so they can find the solutions that the state cannot provide. Various groups of people are recognized as civic actors in the GCS as NGOs are not the only civic actors. Civic actors can be transnational activists, civil society organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that cross national borders (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). O’Brien defines these GCS actors as volunteers, non-profit associations, and profit-seeking NGOs (O’Brien, 2005). I therefore define these various actors in the GCS as global people who participate in global issues and problems across state borders.

These global people consider global issues beyond the individual state level, such as global warming, unexpected activities by terrorists, and inappropriate nuclear activities, as well as problems related to the low quality of human life in civic activities, such as the lack of security, gender inequality, economic development, and racial discrimination. Jaeger describes these different charac-
teristics of the GCS as a people-centered space (Jaeger, 2007). In the people-centric sphere of the GCS, global people find solutions from an internalized personal process that helps to improve human capability, instead of waiting until the state recognizes it must provide for their needs, and external assistance that develops the governing process between a state and its citizens.

When the GCS brings about these people-to-people solutions, there are still critical arguments about these global solutions from the GCS because people debate if these global people are a threat to the state’s sovereignty. I reject this idea as global people are not interested in the same rational zero-sum game of power with the state. Instead, global people prefer to cooperate with the state in order to resolve the issues of human activities. This view of the preferences of global civil actors is substantiated by Jaeger who argues that global people are a –partner‖ of governance instead of a rival and an outsider to the state’s systems (Jaeger, 2007). He insists that global people trigger international discourses about law, order, and management that go beyond any state’s interests and attention. Through these international discourses, global people can participate in the process of governance in political systems.

Within the international discourses about global people, the UN GC can be one type of –interpretive communities‖ that Johnstone suggests (Johnstone, 2005). In this way, the role of the GC is to place private actors into formal international practical processes. GC mediates the legal conflicts between different actors in business and increases global accountability in private sectors. Nowadays, transnational corporations are a core source of economic growth in various countries, but they still need to increase their business responsibility for internal and external conflicts between state and non-state actors. GC uses international expertise, knowledge, and networks to reduce the gap between IOs, states, and people when each actor has difficulties in accepting and applying international norms for appropriate business behaviors in global relations.

Buchanan and Keohane explain the importance of legal accountability in global institutions by noting that global institutions (like IOs) have limitations on increasing their legal accountability because setting the legal standards for accountability and sharing this new norm should require knowing how to deliver this norm to every actor in a global society (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). A GC can resolve these problems by being an interpreter through networks and revealing the mistaken conceptualization of the normative framework from one actor to other actors and explaining the legal positions of each actor and why legal practices are required in global activities, such as humanitarian interventions, working environments, and anti-corruption.

GC shows the actual possibility of applying the concept of governmentality (self-governing) in global governance. Jaeger makes a significant point about how to apply Foucault’s governmentality at the international level (Jaeger, 2007). He applies the people-centric perspective to global political strategies in order to depoliticize global issues worldwide. This means that people are the most important factor in the global activities instead of any political means or ends. Jaeger suggests that
governmentality transforms the solutions to global problems from the top-down power of the state-centric political issues to the technical and managerial processes of global governing mechanisms. Lipschutz addresses how global people use their institutional and productive powers to emphasize each actor—states, IOs, and even individual people—can build their own governmentality by improving the management process of their behaviors and establishing rules to maintain the structural efficiency among all actors (Lipschutz, 2005). He defines global governmentality as more than global governance because of the various arrangements of the actors’ and institutions’ rules and their rules over each other. These rules create a web of global governmentality. From this web woven among global people, global issues are not only political problems that are situated at the state level, but everyone should manage their own behaviors, so that everyone increases his or her social responsibilities as part of the individual governing process.

GC is a precise example of practicing global governmentality when private actors agree to change their behavior in more constrictive ways in order to solve global issues by themselves. According to GC, each private actor builds up his or her business responsibility that exceeds the state’s regulations. Lawrence and Beamish (2013) said, Legal regulation often lags behind the problems it is trying to regulate. Corporate responsibility, however, addresses problems that cannot and should not be postponed until nation-states get it right. Understood in this way, the Global Compact is needed because it reflects a flexible and pragmatic way to address those omnipresent governance gaps that the rise of the global economy has created.

Therefore, GC helps private actors to expand their self-governing process onto a global level and this will reduce international conflicts through global practices. Strengthening the role of GC is challenged by the weakness of global people who are the major component of GC in current global relations. This role, however, depends on how we reinforce the status of global people in international relations. Global people should develop the two major issues to strengthen their role as global connectors among various actors:

1) How can global people be qualified to participate in the international political decision-making process as a formal member like other actors such as states and IOs?

2) How do global people have transparency and accountability in their activities?

First, including GCS as a formal member of international activities should require having international criteria about how global people can participate in global decision-making. Both global people and other actors are involved in creating the conduct of global membership, so each actor has a chance to participate in international activities in formal ways. Kuper suggests eight criteria (basicness, inclusiveness, distributive subsidiarity, democratic control permanence, non-deception, audit, non-dependence, and non-partisanship) for distinguishing relevant actors who can join in the global assembly (Kuper, 2004). We can accept Kuper’s criteria as part of the conduct of global membership, but we need to verify whether his criteria have the equality and efficiency to accept various
kinds of GCS. If these criteria become another form of a gatekeeper that prevents global people from participating in formal activities in international relations, then it will be another form of restriction that permits only certain actors to make international decisions in formal global institutions such as the UN Security Council and International Criminal Court. We have concerns about how we can make reasonable international criteria to accept global people as formal members in global activities. We should not abandon this effort to find a suitable standard for global people because these processes are part of improving global governance, which, in turn, will provide more practice to search for the right path to develop global governance with all kinds of actors in global relations. When we have more people involved in supporting global governance, we can implement strong standards that involve more global actors in global systems.

Second, transparency and accountability issues are the problems of GCS and of the global actors struggling with these issues. The reason these two concepts are so important in global relations is because every political activity that could possibly influence the quality of human life requires including people’s best interests and needs and improving people’s lives. This means that global politics is for all people who live in the world, so it should have more solid structures and processes that can deal with the global issues and problems without any discrimination or limitation. However, this is the most difficult part, that of presenting the perfect transparency and accountability to every actor in global politics. Therefore, all global actors—GCS, states, and IOS—should build a monitoring process to help each actor maintain transparency and accountability in internal and external ways. Having global people in a global political relationship will encourage the application of rigid monitoring programs that increase transparency and accountability in global activities. This is because global people are the connectors between states, actors, and IOs, so they can draw attention to global issues.

State actors and IOs can decide which connectors of global people are most efficient between them. From these processes, global people can develop their activities and behaviors to match the needs of the other actors’ criteria. According to this connected model of global people, the transparency and accountability of each actor will increase along with that of other actors in global relations. From these interpretive and connected roles of global people, the GC has become a part of a place where people practice the governing process for their issues with other people globally. GC contributes to guiding various actors in global businesses onto the right path, so that these governing practices extend from a single person to the global level, so that states and people are connected by the strong political bonds needed to satisfy their needs and wills. Moreover, when global people share the self-governing process through GC, the failures or absences of global governance will become irrelevant, as people emphasize their own responsibility for overcoming the weaknesses of the global governing process.

The current global society is more concentrated on people. People should be put first before any political situation. When we approach these human issues outside of political realms, we can more easily find solutions by lending each other a helping hand. With a global helping hand from GC, the state will no longer view global people as threat of state sovereignty; instead, they will contribute as
a leverage to improve this global transition so that the governance finally considers the link from the states to each person.

**Bibliography**


ANNEX I:

Agenda of the Summer School on Multilateral Diplomacy

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<td>09:45 a.m.</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Welcome Coffee and Introduction: “Global Challenges for Multi-Lateral Diplomacy in the 21st Century”</td>
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<td>Ms. Yvonne Lodico, Head, UNITAR New York Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:15 a.m.</td>
<td>Global Governance: Who runs the United Nations?</td>
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<td>Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, Senior Fellow, UNITAR New York Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Relationship Between the Different UN Organs</td>
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<td>Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, Senior Fellow, UNITAR New York Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Public Perception of the UN and Relationship with the Media</td>
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<td>Ms. Nancy Groves, Social Media Team Leader, Department of Public Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00 p.m.</td>
<td>The UN Charter—Is it keeping up with our changing world?</td>
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<td>3:45 p.m.</td>
<td>Tour of the UN</td>
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<td>4:45 p.m.</td>
<td>End of the day</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Discussion on the Situation in Syria&lt;br&gt;Sarah Rendtorff-Smith, Policy and Planning Officer, Senior Planning Coordinator’s Office, Inter-Agency Task Force for Syria&lt;br&gt;Critical Issues in Global Security&lt;br&gt;Mr. Walid Abdelkarim, Principle Director and Team Leader, Somalia planning team and support to the African Union, DPKO</td>
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<td>11:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Sexual Violence and Gender Perspective&lt;br&gt;Ms. Heidi Modro, Former Chief Regional officer, UN/DPKO Mission to Haiti//Special Assistant, UN Mission in Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:45 a.m.</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Rule of Law and Democratic Institution Building in Post-Conflict Countries, Mainstreaming Gender Considerations&lt;br&gt;Ms. Yvonne Lodico, Head, UNITAR NYO&lt;br&gt;Ms. Heidi Modro, Former Chief Regional officer, UN/DPKO Mission to Haiti//Special Assistant, UN Mission in Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Challenges for Creating Sustainable Peace: Experiences from the Field&lt;br&gt;Ms. Yvonne Lodico, Former Special Advisor, Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:45 p.m.</td>
<td>Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect&lt;br&gt;Ms. Gillian Kitley, Head of Office, Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide</td>
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<td>4:45 p.m.</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations in the Framework of Chapter VII&lt;br&gt;Ms. Claudia Banz, Political Affairs Officer, UN DPKO</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Conclusion of the day</td>
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### Wednesday 19 June

#### Global Sustainable Development

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<td>Wrapping up the MDGs: Where we Stand</td>
<td>Mr. Nikhil Chandavarkar, Chief, Communications and Outreach Branch, Division for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>10:45 a.m.</td>
<td>The post-2015 Agenda</td>
<td>Mr. Paul Ladd, Senior Advisor and Head of the UNDP Team on Post-2015</td>
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<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Public Private Partnerships and the UN</td>
<td>Mr. Edward Mackle, Project Manager for UN-Business Partnerships, United Nations Global Compact</td>
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<td>Climate Change Conference Negotiations, Outcomes of Doha</td>
<td>Ms. Elizabeth Burleson, Professor, PACE Law School</td>
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<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
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<td>3:45 p.m.</td>
<td>The UN Combating Crime: Drugs, Human Trafficking, Piracy</td>
<td>Mr. Piero Bonadeo, Deputy Representative, New York Office, UNODC</td>
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<td>4:30 p.m.</td>
<td>UN Reform: Critical Discussion of System Wide Coherence</td>
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<td>UNITAR QCPR DVD</td>
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<td>5:35 p.m.</td>
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<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Negotiation and Public Speaking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Minh A. Luong, Principal, Advocacy Associates Consultants; Ann Arbor / Michigan Past positions: Director, Ivy Scholars Program; Associate Director, Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy; and Assistant Director, International Security Studies; Yale University, New Haven / Connecticut</td>
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<td>11:30 a.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Negotiation and Public Speaking (part two)</td>
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<td>Dr. Minh Luong</td>
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<td>1:00 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Drafting Resolutions and The UN Charter—Is it keeping up with our changing world?</td>
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<td>Mr. Larry Johnson, Adjunct Professor, Columbia Law School, Former Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs</td>
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<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
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<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Research Training: Effective Use of UN Documentation</td>
<td>Ms. Joelle Sciboz, Librarian, Dag Hammarskjöld Library</td>
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<td>Presentation of Research Project Proposals</td>
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<td>12:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Career Opportunities at and around the UN</td>
<td>Mr. John Ericson, Head, Outreach Unit, Office of Human Resources Management</td>
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<td>3:00 p.m.</td>
<td>The UN Security Council: Moving Forward</td>
<td>Professor Richard Gowan, NYU Center on International Cooperation, Associate Director Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations</td>
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<td>Evaluations and Final Group Discussion</td>
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<td>Conclusion of the Workshop</td>
<td>Ms. Yvonne Lodico, Head, UNITAR NYO Office</td>
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