Hiroshima for Global Peace:
Enhanced Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament, Conflict Resolution
and Post-conflict Reconstruction

Introduction

Hiroshima has long embraced a vision to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and have consistently worked toward that purpose, investing tangible resources. As the world continues to change in the 21st century, we now observe hopeful signs that we are moving forward to that vision. President Obama has recommitted the United States to work in good faith toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and has started to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy as a concrete step toward that goal. In this proposal, we wish to take this historical moment to revamp the vision that has guided our contribution to global peace, so that the future generations may live in a more peaceful world.

We call on the leaders of all of other governments with nuclear weapons to likewise recommit their governments to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and take concrete measures to stop arms race and start the disarmament process. We also call upon the leaders of non-nuclear weapons states to accept their shared responsibility to work toward nuclear disarmament. Their efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and increase multilateral control of the fuel cycle are important actions in that direction.

For its part, Hiroshima hereby recommits itself to renew its efforts to work toward a world without nuclear weapons. The proposal issued here is a call for partners in creative initiatives to address both longstanding and new emerging threats. Hiroshima cannot, of course, create a nuclear free world alone. But it can galvanize world public opinion, use its convening power to host annual roundtables, and inspire others to join us in this vital quest for a more secure future.

Steps toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, however, are insufficient to achieve sustainable peace. Incessant violent civil wars and international conflicts have destroyed the lives of so many in the world, the very instability that lead toward further
violence and terrorism. We must, therefore, work on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction at the same time as we move on for further nuclear disarmament.

Against this backdrop, we propose a 3 x 3 approach, which revolves around the three key challenges (1) nuclear abolition; (2) reconstruction and peacebuilding; and (3) envisioning a new security architecture, and three actions: (1) generating theories for peace; (2) assisting peace making/building practices through human resource development and research; and (3) generating creative ideas and disseminating messages. In casting an enhanced vision we seek to continue efforts towards nuclear disarmament but at the same time embrace new initiatives for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In the following, we propose a set of concrete action plans that will take us to a world free of nuclear weapons, promote sustainable peace in regions torn apart by violent conflicts, with a new role for Hiroshima as a hub for global peace.

Part One: Setting the Agenda

(1) Why Hiroshima?

Why do we make this proposal from Hiroshima? The first reason should be obvious, for Hiroshima was among the two cities that were bombed by nuclear weapons, and the cry “No more Hiroshimas” has been shared by its inhabitants over the subsequent decades. The second reason, however, is important as well; as a city that was restored from the ashes and born again as the city of peace, Hiroshima has paid close attention to the miseries of war overseas. It is only natural and appropriate, therefore, that Hiroshima should be the place for proposing both a non-nuclear future and peace-building in regions torn by violent conflicts.

a. Atomic-bombed Hiroshima

Before and during World War II, Hiroshima was among the many centers of the Japanese military establishment, with army regiments, gunpowder factories, and military academies in the vicinity. After the atomic bombing, Hiroshima achieved a new identity as a center for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the promotion of peace. The bomb totally destroyed Hiroshima, killing 140,000, injuring and/or exposing to radiation two hundred thousand more. It destroyed not only human lives and infrastructure but also families, local communities, and memories, leaving few if any photographs to remember the
deceased. Survivors took it as their responsibility to tell what happened and work for the future.

The bombing nursed a commitment to peace among the people of Hiroshima, who began to call for action to prevent another nuclear disaster. Through these efforts, the government and the people of Hiroshima appealed to the world, asserting that humans cannot coexist with nuclear weapons and that nuclear weapons must be abolished. The appeals from Hiroshima and Nagasaki motivated worldwide anti-nuclear movements calling for the abolition of nuclear arms, making Hiroshima, along with Nagasaki, a symbol of anti-nuclear and peace movements. Considering such sustained efforts in the past, we believe Hiroshima is the right place to start a new initiative for reducing and abolishing nuclear weapons from the Earth.

b. Utilizing the lessons of reconstruction

As a symbol, Hiroshima stands not only for a non-nuclear world but also for peacebuilding in regions torn apart by interstate wars, civil wars, and extreme violence in general. Hiroshima is a place sobered by the loss of life, destruction of infrastructure, severe illness caused by radiation from the atomic bomb, and discrimination and prejudice against the A-bomb survivors. The people of Hiroshima have now constructed a prosperous community. Remembering their own hardships, the governments and communities of Hiroshima were keenly aware of the challenges of post-war reconstruction. Here the painful experiences of the past have led to active contributions to reconstruction and peacebuilding, especially after the end of the Cold War.

Formulating the “Hiroshima International Contribution Plan” (1996) and the “Hiroshima Peace Contribution Plan Report” (2003), Hiroshima has already made significant contributions in three core fields, namely network building, reconstruction assistance, and human resources development. These initiatives were supported by various actors and institutions such as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Hiroshima Office, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Chugoku International Center (CIC), the Hiroshima International Cooperation Center (HICC), Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC), the Hiroshima International Council for Health Care of the Radiation-Exposed (HICARE), the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University, and Peace Science Institute of Hiroshima University, along with various other non-governmental organizations.

We believe Hiroshima’s initiative toward peacebuilding is necessary and should be further enhanced, if only because the human suffering in war-torn regions is not only unjust but also constitutes a major challenge to world peace, for political instability in post-conflict regions may lead to failed states and militant terrorism. Our focus on nuclear disarmament,
therefore, must be combined with efforts for peacebuilding. Furthermore, the simple fact that Hiroshima has arisen out of the devastation of nuclear annihilation will nourish faith in reconstruction among the people in the conflict regions.

c. Toward a Hiroshima Peace Plan

   The purpose of our peace plan is to help advance Hiroshima as a hub for promoting global peace. We wish to construct a hub in Hiroshima that will channel the demands for nuclear disarmament into actual policy, by consolidating worldwide calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons, both by governments and non-governmental actors, and by promoting inter-governmental negotiations that will convert such hope into reality. We further wish to call for building a hub in Hiroshima where those who aspire to peacebuilding in conflict regions, again both governmental and non-governmental personnel, will gather together and acquire both the resources and training required to carry out the immediate processes. Last but not least, we view Hiroshima as a hub of academic contributions in peace research, making use of the various institutions in Hiroshima, of which there are many, and attracting scholars from overseas to promote studies on strategic arms control and disarmament, conflict resolution, and all efforts directed to the objective of building peace.

   This is a tall order. Hiroshima, however, is a place where we can expect the full and active participation of the people in confronting such a daunting challenge. Few if any will doubt the symbolic character that has come to be attached to Hiroshima as a peace hub; Hiroshima has already provided an open space for all countries and actors around the world promoting world peace, with the local governments directly involved in peacebuilding. We are, therefore, making this statement here to highlight Hiroshima as both a historically significant city and as an active hub for carrying out those activities necessary to promote world peace.

(2) Why Now?

   Nuclear disarmament stands at a critical moment. On the one hand, recent developments have renewed our hope that we are moving toward nuclear arms reduction. President Obama recommitted the United States with force and passion by his vision toward a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ in his Prague speech of April 2009, a rare instance for an American president to advocate not only the reduction but also the abolition of nuclear weapons. Related developments include the Japan-Australia initiative to establish the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which has proposed a program for comprehensive nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the
new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) from the United States, which, by clearly stating negative security assurance, opened path for reducing the temptation for nuclear proliferation; adoption of the Final Document with a 64-item action plan at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and, last but not least, the signing and ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the United States and Russia. Such developments underscore that we are making progress toward a ‘world without nuclear weapons.’

On the other hand, we recognize many challenges to achieving nuclear disarmament. Nuclear proliferation has developed to an alarming degree, and it has expanded to regions that were previously free from nuclear weapons. Major reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals should be welcomed, but progress in Russo-American strategic arms reduction does not assure non-proliferation or nuclear arms reduction in other regions and nations. In fact, nuclear proliferation to North Korea and the apparent lack of progress in the Six-party Talks have reassured, not weakened, the dependence on nuclear deterrence in the East Asian region. Nuclear disarmament between the US and Russia alone will have only a limited impact on nations that find nuclear deterrence or extended deterrence to be essential for preserving national security.

Moreover, at the same time when initial hopeful signs of nuclear disarmament have started, a new threat has emerged, in the form of nuclear terrorism. The September 11th 2001 attacks should remind us that terrorists seek the mass-killing of non-combatants as part of their political agenda. The growth of terrorism is linked to the failure of peace building in many regions around the world including failed states. Therefore the contributions of Hiroshima should not only be important in reducing the risk of nuclear annihilation but also in building peace as a means to reduce the threat emerging from terrorism.

What should be done? We strongly believe that the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity, and that any peace that depends on nuclear weapons is undesirable and unsustainable. We further believe a disarmament process between the United States and Russia is, although important, still inadequate to ensure the transition to a world without nuclear weapons, and that states other than those with nuclear weapons should be more involved in the process of nuclear disarmament. Such a process should not just end in delegitimizing nuclear weapons in general; we need to focus on specific international tensions and potential military conflicts so that we may seek alternative ways and means of sustainable peace that do not depend on nuclear capability. In short, we must find a way to reduce, minimize, and ultimately eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in international conflicts, in other words, denuclearize international conflicts.

Here we would like to propose a multilateral process of international negotiations that focuses not only on proposals for comprehensive nuclear disarmament but also on denuclearizing potential international conflicts, that is, decreasing the present dependence on
nuclear capability for national security. This, after all, was the agenda for nuclear arms control in the heyday of the USSR-US Cold War; we must not forget that the disarmament process between the United States and Russia was only made possible when the leaders of the two nations took initiatives to move from an era of the arms race to a mutual reduction of nuclear weapons, a bold step toward denuclearizing their mutual relations.

Aside from Russo-American relations, such initiatives to denuclearize international conflicts cannot be observed anywhere today. As things stand, the present disarmament process between the US and Russia will fizzle out in the foreseeable future. If we truly wish a world without nuclear weapons as our future, we must take further steps to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in international conflicts beyond Russia-US relations. These efforts should not be limited to Russia and the United States; non-nuclear states have a role to play in nuclear disarmament.

(3) Three Challenges

Concerning our objective of nuclear disarmament, what ought to be done? Well aware of the many constructive proposals on the table, we wish to call attention to the following three agenda items that we believe deserve more attention.

a. Beyond bilateralism

First, in spite of the many proposals for comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the actual reduction of nuclear weapons has been more or less dominated by the US-Russia bilateral process. As the United States and Russia possess more than 90 percent of all nuclear weapons on Earth, this focus on bilateralism was quite understandable, but the nuclear weapons held by powers aside from these two were virtually left intact in this process.

This focus on a bilateral process will pose a challenge to comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Bilateral reduction of nuclear weapons has proceeded in a way that assured the numerical supremacy of Russian and American nuclear weapons: however many warheads the two cut, the two nations still hold far more than other nuclear powers. If both the US and Russia wish to maintain such a preponderance of numbers in the future, it follows that bilateral reduction will slow down as their numbers come closer to those of other powers. Russian and American initiative toward nuclear disarmament, therefore, will fizzle out if the process is kept at the bilateral level.

How, then, can we engage nuclear-armed states other than the US and Russia in a more comprehensive nuclear disarmament? It is easy to see the reluctance of nuclear-armed states other than the US and Russia to be involved, as their capability is much smaller. Unless
a new agenda is set, however, not only will those states with smaller numbers of nuclear weapons be left out of disarmament, but we must also expect a slowing down and eventual halt of the bilateral process as well.

The agenda here should be clear enough. Unless we involve more nations other than the US and Russia in the reduction of strategic arms and initiate a more multilateral process of nuclear disarmament, we will never be able to abolish nuclear weapons in the future. How can we establish a multilateral disarmament process that integrates nuclear-armed states with divergent strategic priorities and interests over nuclear weapons without waiting for progress in the next round of the new START talks and diminishing the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia to a certain level?

A proposal for multilateral nuclear disarmament must accompany security assurances to the participating nations and others who will be affected by nuclear disarmament, for the reduction of nuclear weapons may cause alarm concerning possible vulnerability. We must also discuss the challenges related to nuclear non-proliferation, including international monitoring of nuclear fissile and radioactive materials, multilateral inspection and management of enrichment, reprocessing, and spent fuel storage facilities, and measures against nuclear terrorism. Failure to provide such measures will strengthen the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provides better security than nuclear disarmament, thus jeopardizing any dialogue or negotiations that aim for the reduction and future abolition of nuclear weapons.

We must, in short, make sure that the process of nuclear disarmament will provide security instead of instability. This leads us to our proposal in the form of consecutively held multilateral negotiations, both at the inter-governmental and non-governmental level, continuing in a way that, while collectively working on the mutual reduction of nuclear weapons, build the confidence and security of participating nations and seek every opportunity to turn informal gentlemen’s agreements into more formal institutions based on legal and binding agreements. This is our first challenge.

b. Focus on regional conflicts

Nuclear-armed states have often defended their nuclear capability as essential to their national defense given the lack of regional security. Although we do not need to accept such a justification, the question remains: how can we address the stability of regional order as an underlying factor to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons?

As far as relations between the US and Russia are concerned, traditional concepts of nuclear deterrence no longer serve much utility, as the relationship between the two nations has developed to a level of stability that does not require mutual threats of assured destruction. If we turn our eyes to other regions, however, we can still observe inter-state relations
dependent on deterrence and extended deterrence. The threat of a major nuclear war between the United States and Russia may have receded, but such a development has yet to be seen in other areas.

The Asian region is a case in point. Virtually all new nuclear-armed states, including India, Pakistan, and North Korea, maintain their nuclear capability as essential to their national defense. The relationship between China and neighboring nations remains more volatile than Russo-American relations at the present, leading to sustained dependence on deterrence and extended deterrence. It goes without saying, too, that nuclear proliferation to the Middle East will further jeopardize efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, we must establish a connection between multilateral nuclear disarmament and regional security. Many nuclear-armed states do not have a strategic objective at the global level; they focus on more narrowly defined security concerns such as regional rivalries or regime survival. Although the importance of addressing regional security has been addressed before, previous proposals for nuclear disarmament have paid little attention to the intricate details of regional conflicts.

Are there any ways to get international conflicts that largely depend on nuclear capability to depend less on nuclear weapons? How can we reduce such reliance on nuclear weapons in regional conflicts? This is the second challenge we face.

c. Addressing peace building

Up to this day, contributions in nuclear disarmament have been somewhat treated separately from efforts directed toward bringing peace to regional conflicts. We believe otherwise; we see the need to go beyond nuclear arms control.

Many of the powers with nuclear capabilities lie in regions facing significant security tensions that may develop into actual warfare. In regions where military clashes might arise from a whole range of possibilities, including ethnic or religious conflicts, continuing disputes over contested borders, or the lack of state capacity to control domestic radical militants, the possibility of nuclear weapons being not only developed but actually used in military engagements is undeniably real. And even if nuclear weapons were not actually used in regional conflicts, the emergence of failed states will provide a political vacuum that may be exploited by militant groups or terrorists to develop nuclear weapons of their own. This clearly shows us that efforts toward nuclear disarmament must be observed in the broader perspective of bringing peace in regional conflicts, including preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.

Hiroshima is entitled to commit itself to actively engaging in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Most post-conflict societies that have experienced total destruction need to rise up out of despair to pursue rebirth and reconstruction. Hiroshima went through a similar
process. After its experience of mass killing, Hiroshima achieved physical recovery in terms of the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure. Government functions such as basic public services were also restored. This was a painful process, especially for hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors), who endured decades of physical and psychological sufferings. Post-conflict societies, similarly facing the need for physical and mental recovery, will confront the long and arduous task of mental reconstruction.

Therefore, Hiroshima’s experience, especially from the viewpoints of ordinary people who actually shouldered the burden of reconstruction, could be shared with the people involved in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Hiroshima has the potential to help them toward this goal by sharing its pains and sorrows. This is an important asset of Hiroshima, which should be cultivated through its negative legacy, and should be put to full use in the process of peacebuilding.

In engaging broader efforts to build peace, the Hiroshima community needs to address the possible challenges that could arise when working on post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in failed states or nations at war. It is important to note that confidence building, capacity-building and long-term financial commitment are absolutely necessary to achieve success in peace building. In that light, perhaps the main challenge for Hiroshima is to change the paradigm that has guided developed nations to focus solely on infrastructure reconstruction when dealing with post-conflict nations. We believe this to be our third challenge.

Part Two: Action Proposals

What, then, can we do in facing those three challenges? Here is the list of specific proposals that should be pursued.

(1) Actions toward Disarmament

a. Promoting disarmament and non-proliferation

We believe the new START process between the US and Russia to be a step in the right direction that should be supported by the international community. Moreover, this process should seek active engagement from other nuclear-armed states, so that the present bilateral process of nuclear arms reduction can develop into a multilateral process of nuclear arms control and eventual reduction.
More specifically, we believe the following measures to be of particular importance in further development of the nuclear disarmament process, all of which have been proposed in the past but not yet implemented.

1) All nuclear-armed states should now explicitly commit not to increase the number of their nuclear weapons.
2) We welcome the agreement among the UK, France, and China for a nuclear-free future, and urge them to submit concrete proposals for the eventual reduction of their nuclear weapons in order to launch a multilateral disarmament process that includes all nuclear-armed states.
3) New and unequivocal negative security assurances should be given by all nuclear-arms states that they will not use nuclear weapons against any NPT-compliant non-nuclear-armed state.
4) The negotiations on nuclear disarmament must involve the non-nuclear states in substantive roles, and must seek out possible roles for local governments and non-governmental actors in civil society.

b. Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons

The end of the Cold War, which provided the basis for the START process, was essentially a development between the US, Russia, and Europe, while the security arrangements for the rest of the world more or less remained untouched; nuclear disarmament was excluded from efforts aimed at tension reduction and conflict management. The Six-party Talks on the future of the Korean peninsula were the sole exception to this rule, but the outcomes of these negotiations have so far been limited.

What is needed here is a process that will build confidence among potential adversaries so that each power may reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence for its security. This is a tall order, for no power will be willing to give up its nuclear arsenal without sufficient assurance of its security. We propose a series of international negotiations, to be held first in the city of Hiroshima that brings together nuclear and non-nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific region to consider possible measures for easing tensions and the mutually reducing nuclear arms.

More particularly, governments in the Asia-Pacific region should start the following:

1) The Six-party Talks in Northeast Asia should be pursued not only to successfully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but also to establish security in East Asia without the current dependence on nuclear deterrence.
2) Every effort should be made to achieve the participation of the non-NPT nuclear states to also join in the effort for achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their respective regions.

3) All states should agree to take effective measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, both military and civilian, effectively countering the possibility of nuclear terrorism.

c. Strengthening international mechanisms

Diplomatic negotiations on conflict management must be accompanied by efforts among international institutions that govern nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. We strongly support the recommendations made by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), and would like to propose a regional process that focuses on the following agenda:

1) The role of the IAEA in monitoring the development of nuclear energy-related facilities should be strengthened. We also propose a parallel regional system in Asia that will support the global efforts of the IAEA at the regional level.

2) More efforts should be made in multilateral management of enrichment, reprocessing, and spent fuel storage facilities in the Asian region. These efforts should cover the management of all civilian use of nuclear materials.

3) We will seek all nations in the Asian region to share firm commitments to the development of a multilateral security architecture that reduces the significance of nuclear weapons in their deterrent utility.

(2) Enhancing Peace from Hiroshima

Nuclear weapon elimination and peacebuilding require a longer-standing commitment. A structure such as a “hub” for global peace would be more suitable than short-term policy initiatives. We believe the following actions would be important for Hiroshima to function as a global peace hub:

To achieve such purpose, we would like to propose a Hiroshima Roundtable for discussing strategies to multilateralize disarmament process with special attention to regional security dynamics in Asia. This is a proposal for a Track-II dialogue, but should be open to participation of representatives from individual governments as well, with a vision to upgrade it into Track 1.5, and then to Track I. We believe bringing delegates and participants to
Hiroshima will provide an appropriate venue for a dialogue addressed to control and decrease reliance on nuclear weapons as well as building peace. This roundtable should be a spring board to achieve the following agenda.

**a. Supporting the roadmap for the abolition of nuclear weapons**

Determined to realize the abolition of nuclear weapons, Hiroshima would contribute to the process of abolishing nuclear weapons in a sustainable and substantial way. Possible actions would be:

1) Suggestions and support for citizens-based international conferences, i.e., “Track II initiatives,” on nuclear abolition, which may lead to a new special session of the United Nation on Disarmament to be held in Hiroshima. Efforts in this arena would prepare the concrete foundations for governmental conferences on nuclear disarmament, and lead to specific achievements.

2) Evaluation of the implementation of various nuclear disarmament initiatives and agreements such as the final documents of the NPT Review Conference, ICNND, and new START, possibly in the form of score card to measure the achievement. These efforts would visualize stakeholders’ commitments on nuclear disarmament, and provide motivation to commit further.

**b. Reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism**

Nuclear terrorism will remain a risk throughout the long road toward a world without nuclear weapons, and indeed, even if we achieve complete nuclear weapons disarmament, the danger of terrorists making a radioactive “dirty bomb” or an improvised nuclear device out of highly enriched uranium or plutonium will remain. The history of Hiroshima should both remind us that horrible nuclear destruction is possible and that a resilient people can recover over time from great tragedy and loss. We believe therefore that Hiroshima can serve as an important hub, through our roundtable meetings and educational efforts to address the following:

1) Build peace in conflict-ridden societies and reduce the perceived incentives for individuals or groups to resort to violence, including potential nuclear terrorism, to achieve their aims.
2) Develop and promote the highest possible standards for nuclear materials security and promote adoption of best practices for the protection of civilian nuclear materials to keep them out of the hands of terrorists.

3) Develop and promote best practices to mitigate the consequences of any use of a dirty bomb and to improve societies’ ability for physical and mental recovery if terrorist incidents ever to occur.

c. Developing human resources to build a peaceful international community

To build a peaceful world without nuclear weapons and to achieve post-conflict rehabilitation, it is essential that the international community nurture and mobilize politicians and the public. Education is essential for the current practitioners and for the future generation; we need to develop appropriate human resources, educational materials, and organized site visits.

To support such efforts, Hiroshima should aim to serve as a center for developing human resources through extensive practical programs. Possible actions would be:

1) Expanding the capability to provide concrete training programs for specialists in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and conflict prevention
2) Establishing networks among institutions and specialists to provide opportunities for information sharing and advanced training in the interim between field activities
3) Accumulating practice and outcomes in field activities for future commitment, education, and training
4) Coordinating with civil society, UNITAR, JICA, and Hiroshima University would contribute significantly to the above.

d. Creating ideas for nuclear disarmament, conflict resolution, and building peace

Various theoretical and experimental studies are essential to lead nuclear disarmament and achieve world peace. To provide a center of excellence for such research activities would be essential for accumulating existing knowledge and wisdom, and for generating synergy among various research attempts and findings. In short, Hiroshima would serve as a hub for knowledge management in the areas of nuclear disarmament, conflict resolution and peace building. We believe Hiroshima can serve such a function. Possible actions would be:
1) Promoting diverse forms of peace-related studies in universities and research institutes
2) Examining the effective use of accumulated expertise on post-conflict reconstruction
3) Expanding the existing framework to engage in conflict resolution and peace dialogues.

e. Building a sustainable peace-support mechanism

Hiroshima should be aiming to establish a position for itself not only as a symbol of peace but also as the center of a network of activities aimed at realizing peace. Hiroshima should equip itself with a support mechanism for global peace by transforming itself into a support hub where new activities for peace are created, by bringing, gathering and uniting resources such as people, ideas and financial investments from around the world into the community.

If a firm longer-standing commitment is required, however, we should not expect only the people of Hiroshima to bear the financial burden while we pursue these goals. Accordingly, in order to ensure that activities are not curtailed by the vagaries of the political or financial situation of a local government, we propose instead establishing a mechanism possessing a measure of autonomy. Further, in order for Hiroshima to fulfill its roles and duties, both Hiroshima Prefecture and Hiroshima City must not only further their ties but, leveraging their special characteristics and strengths, also cope with challenges as a unified community.

Hiroshima as a hub for promoting world peace should lead a wide range of commitments for peace, such as fostering comprehensive research in peace-related matters; creating venues for discussions among NGO affiliates, government figures, people with practical business experience, and scholars currently involved in nuclear weapons elimination and/or peacebuilding; and comprehensively coordinating “needs and seeds” for sustainable commitment.

We believe Hiroshima to be an ideal choice for the hub to pursue and promote the proposals listed above. As a city that suffered nuclear annihilation, Hiroshima has been the center for many movements that pursue nuclear disarmament and abolition. We are aware that Japan has been on the receiving end of extended nuclear deterrence, but then this only strengthens our belief that a peace relying less on nuclear arms is far better than one dependent on nuclear deterrence. The aim here is to translate the hope and will for nuclear disarmament into actual policy; we believe this proposal to be one that will bring us closer to that ideal.
This proposal is a report based on the first round discussions of task force and formulation committee members, which will be further developed and revised in the future. The proposal, therefore, may not necessarily reflect the views of all members of the formulation committee or the task force.